does not solve the problem of those whose headaches, indigestion, backache, etc. are due to “nerves”. Commonly a busy family doctor will ascribe them to some physical cause and as a matter of routine prescribe a drug. Once again the symptoms are being cured rather than the disease itself. It may be true to say, as one doctor suggested recently, that over half of the cases that come to the ordinary doctor’s attention are not purely physical ailments. If this is so, the situation is serious indeed.
69. The author thinks that drugs used for treating psychological ills ______
A could be ineffective in some cases. B usually have harmful side effects. C can greatly alleviate the illnesses. D can remove the root causes. 70. The controversy mentioned in the passage focuses on ___ A whether psychologists should use drugs to cure their patients.
B how psychologists should treat their patients. C the fact that all of the drugs have harmful side effects.
D the extent to which drugs should be used to fight psychological illness. 71. The passage indicates that psychologists _____
A find it impossible to remove a psychological disease B feel dissatisfied at treating their patients with drugs.
C believe that the root cause of a disease can be ignored. D can do nothing if the patient is in a depressed state .
72. When treating patients with psychological problems, some doctors feel that they ____ A are at a loss for treatment. B have no right to use drugs.
C have to cure their patients by any means. D should use drugs to treat the symptoms. 73. A family doctor would normally consider a headache or backache as a result of ____
A a more serious disease B some emotional problem. C a physical disorder D prolonged work
74. Regarding the situation of psychological problems the author feels ____ A concerned B hopeless C surprised D disappointed Passage Five
Those who make the rules for financial institution probably should take a modified oath. Their pledge would be: First, do no harm. Second, if the reforms put before me) are unclear, don’t approve them.
Charles Morris may not have intended his new book Money, Greed, and Risk to cast such a dim light on the regulators, but it does. In fact, it may serve as a wake-up call for true believers in our current regulatory structure, most of which was erected in the 1930s and most of which Morris seems to favor, despite the stupid results it has caused.
Morris, a former Chase Manhattan banking executive, outlines in great detail, again and again, how regulators, lawmakers, firms and many of the customers marched straight into mortgage, currency, thrift (互相储蓄) and other investment disasters. His discussion of Regulation Q, an attempt by Congress in the 1960s to rescue ailing savings and loans by regulating interest rates, reveals not only Congressional economic illiteracy, but also the deep harm such foolish thinking can do to the real economy.
After some 260 pages listing the foolish things of Wall Street, regulators and lawmakers, Morris draws some pessimistic conclusions: “One constant in all the crises is that the regulatory responses come only after a crisis hits its peak.” For example, it “took the S&L crisis of the 1980s to bring honest accounting to thrifts, and it wasn’t until the banking sector suffered huge losses in real estate and foreign loans that regulators began to enforce strict capital standards.”
So, what is the point of regulation? Morris, who is excellent at recounting tales of regulation gone