大学英语四级考试冲刺模拟试卷 第2套（写作）
Part Ⅰ Writing Directions: For this part,
30 minutes to write an application for the assistant
librarian in your school. You should write at least 150 words following the outline given below:
1. 介绍你的姓名、班级、专业等基本信息 2. 列举你的优点，证明你能胜任此职位 3. 表明你对此工作的热情，渴望得到锻炼的机会 An Application for the Assistant Librarian
答案:[范文]
An Application for the Assistant Librarian Dear librarian,
I saw your ad on the Library Board this morning and. I am very interested in the post as an assistant librarian. My
I am a sophomore in the Department of
International Journalism. I come from the city of Tianjin.
Currently, I am looking for a chance to enrich my spare time for I can finish my course assignment with ease. In last semester I have taken the computer course and get command of Microsoft Office and other useful software. As majoring in International Journalism, I think it is important for me to communicate with a variety of people. So I can put my communication
class into practice and make many friends in the
library. In addition, I am patient, open-minded and warm-hearted, which I believe is the crucial requirement for this position.
Thanks for your kind consideration. My dorm phone number is 010-12345678 and I'm
looking forward to your early reply. Yours sincerely, Jack [写作点拨]
本文要求写一篇求职信，主要目的是向负责招聘的人介绍自己，使他信服自己能够胜任所申请职位。
题目中给出的提纲来展开即可。第一段介绍自己的姓名、班级、专
业等基本信息，同时向面试者表明自己对此职位有意向；第二段说明你具备的优点能够胜任此职位；第三段表明对招聘人的感谢，留下具体的联系方式，如电话、传真、电子邮件或通讯地址等，但最好不要在作文中出现自己的真实信息。 Part Ⅱ Reading Comprehension (Skimming and Scanning)
Don't Destroy the Essential Catalyst of Risk
Since the spring, and most acutely this autumn, a global contagion (传染)of fear and panic has choked off the arteries of finance, compounding a broader deterioration in the global economy.
Financial institutions have an obligation to the broader financial system. We depend on a healthy, well-functioning system but we failed to raise enough questions about whether some of the trends and practices that had become commonplace really served the public's long-term interests.
Seven important lessons
As policymakers and regulators begin to consider the regulatory actions to be taken to
address the fallings, I believe it is useful to reflect on some of the lessons from tiffs crisis.
The first is that risk management should not be entirely predicated on historical data. In the past several months, we have heard the phrase\more than a few times. If events that were calculated to occur once in 20 years in fact occurred much more regularly, it does not take a mathematician to figure out that risk management assumptions did not reflect the distribution of the actual outcomes. Our industry must do more to enhance and improve scenario analysis and stress testing.
Second, too many financial institutions and investors simply outsourced their risk management. Rather than undertake their own analysis, they relied on the rating agencies to do the essential work of risk analysis for them. This was true at the inception(初期)and over the period of the investment, during which time they did not consider other indicators of financial deterioration.
This over-dependence on credit ratings coincided with the dilution of the desired triple A-rating. In January 2008, there were 12 triple A-rated companies in the world. At the same time, there were 64, 000 structured finance instruments, such as collateralized debt obligations, rated triple A. It is easy and appropriate to blame the rating agencies for lapses in their credit judgments. But the blame for the result is not theirs 'alone. Every financial institution that participated in the process has to accept its share of the responsibility.
Third, size matters. For example, whether you owned $5 billion or $50 billion of
(supposedly) low-risk super senior debt in a CDO, the likelihood of losses was,
proportionally, the same. But the consequences of a miscalculation were obviously much bigger if you had a $50 billion exposure.
Fourth, many risk models incorrectly assumed that positions could be fully hedged. After the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management mid the crisis in emerging markets in 1998, new products such as various basket indices and credit default swaps were created to help offset a number of risks. However, we did not, as an industry, consider carefully enough the possibility that liquidity would dry up, making it difficult to apply effective hedges.
Fifth, risk models failed to capture the risk inherent in off-balance sheet activities, such as structured investment vehicles. It seems clear now that managers of companies with large off-balance sheet exposure did not appreciate the full magnitude of the economic risks they were exposed to; equally worrying, their counterparties were unaware of the full extent of these vehicles and, therefore, could not accurately assess the risk of doing business.
Sixth, complexity got the better of us. The industry let the growth in new instruments outstrip(超过)the operational capacity to manage them. As a result, operational risk increased dramatically and tiffs had a direct effect on the overall stability of the financial system.
Last, and perhaps most important, financial institutions did not account for asset values accurately enough. I have heard some argue that fair value accounting -- which assigns current values to financial assets and liabilities -- is one of the main factors exacerbating(使恶化) the credit crisis. I see it differently. If more institutions had properly valued their
positions and commitments at the outset, they would have been in a much better position to reduce their exposures.
Fair value: a discipline for financial institutions
The daily marking of positions to current market prices was a key contributor to our decision to reduce risk relatively early in markets and in instruments that were deteriorating. This process can be difficult, and sometimes painful, but I believe it is a discipline that should define financial institutions.
As a result of these lessons and others that will emerge from this financial crisis, we should consider important principles for our industry, for policymakers and for regulators. For the industry, we cannot let our ability to innovate exceed our capacity to manage. Given the size and interconnected nature of markets, the growth in volumes, the global nature of trades and their cross-asset characteristics, managing operational risk will only become more important.
Risk and control functions need to be completely independent from the business units. And clarity as to whom risk and control managers report to is crucial to maintaining that independence. Equally important, risk managers need to have at least equal stature with their counterparts on the trading desks: if there is a question about the value of a position or a disagreement about a risk limit, the risk manager's view should always prevail.
Understandably, compensation continues to generate a lot of anger and controversy. We recognize that having troubled asset relief programme money creates an important