TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT IN THE REVOLUTION IN PHYSICS AT THE T(9)

These philosophical principles of the Critical School contain rich
dialectical features as well as some materialist characteristics. The dialectics, in particular, was lacking in the Mechanical School. Guided by these inspiring, effective ideological principles, the Critical School was able to play a reforming role in the revolution of physics, promoting the development of the relativity and quantum theories. Of course, in applying these, they often went to the opposite extreme, forming topsy-turvy views concerning the relationship between matter and consciousness. However, we must not therefore entirely deny the philosophical ideology of the Critical School.
Lenin noted that, “sophisticated idealism is closer to sophisticated materialism than to naïve materialism.”48 Because the Critical School was “closer to sophisticated materialism” under the particular historical circumstances, it was able to promote reform in the revolution in physics at the turn of the century.

III. The Inevitable Historic Path
The representatives of the Mechanical School were all masters of science, knowledgeable and talented, and their contributions to classical physics have been universally acclaimed. However, when a series of new experiments shook the foundations of the classical theories that they had painstakingly constructed, they were limited by the traditional mechanical view and were in capable of undertaking the arduous task of the revolution in physics. They approached the threshold of the new physics yet failed to open the gate leading to the new world.
The achievements and talents of the representatives of the Critical School also contributed significantly to the development of classical physics. However, in contrast to the Mechanical School, their acute thinking and spirit of exploration pioneered the path toward the revolution in physics. Nevertheless, they too failed to complete this revolution. They were hindered by their idealist philosophy with its narrow empiricism, that is, by the limitations of positivism, which slowed the development of science and prevented the Critical School from carrying the revolution to its logical conclusion.
Einstein once criticized Mach, saying
I think his weak point is that he more or less believes that science is only a straightening out of the material of experience. That is to say, he fails to identify the elements of free construction in the formation of concepts. In a sense, he thinks that theory results from discovery rather then invention. He goes to extremes, not only taking “perception” as the only subject for study, but even regarding perception itself as the bricks for the construction of the world of reality…If he thoroughly carries through this idea, he not only must deny the atomic theory but must also deny the concept of physical reality.49
This criticism is pertinent and can be applied, in general terms, to the whole Critical School. Indeed, this school placed an inappropriately strong emphasis on the role of experience, belittling and even entirely denying the function of theory and theoretical thinking in science. Mach regarded scientific investigation as merely “brief descriptions of fact”50 He demanded that all that is “redundant [and]…metaphysical” be “eliminated” from science.51 In his view, “the object of science is the connection of phenomena, but the theories are like dry leaves which fall away when they have long ceased to be the lungs of the tree of science.”52 Duhem also said, “a physical theory is not expanation,”53 but is only “an economical representation [and] classification [of] experimental laws,”54 a “symbolic relation,”55 Pearson thought that physical theory must be satisfied with the describing “how…why remains a mystery.”56 “Science for the past is a description, for the future a belief. It is not, and never has been, an explanation. ”57 Although Phincare, who explicitly opposed belittling the role of theories, recognized that “mathematical physics has an undeniable role to play,”58 he nevertheless limited this role to “editing catalogues.” In his view, “no matter how well a catalogue is edited, it cannot enrich the library.” It only “helps the reader to use its abundant books.”59 Therefore, “science is but a system of relationships”60 and nothing but “classifications.”61