Passage 1-5
While berthed alongside in Tenerife, the cruise ship Arcadia was carrying out a lifeboat drill. One lifeboat was successfully launched and as it was being recovered, the winch hoisting it failed. The lifeboat was still connected to the falls and it dropped back into the sea.
To investigate what had happened, the crew had to wind the falls back onto the winch drum. The lifeboat was disconnected while the crew tried to restart the winch. They were unsuccessful because of a fault on the hand crank cutout switch.
The crew then attempted to wind the falls back on using the hand crank, but because of the time and effort involved, the cutout switch was bypassed and power restored to speed up the operation. The crank handle was left in place.
The winch was started. It began to turn and so too did the handle which hit one of the crew over the head. The investigation found that the winch failed in the first place because the oil used in the winch gearbox was not one recommended. It was too viscose and would have prevented the coupling locking mechanism from operating correctly.
017 It was the fault on the ________ that caused the failure to recover the lift boat
A. crank handle B. hand crank cutout switch C. power system D. falls 018 It was the ________ that hit the crewmember on his head.
A. falls B. hand crank cutout switch C. crank handle D. winch drum 019 The cause of the accident was that ________
A. the oil used in the winch gearbox was too viscose B. the winch drum was connected with the falls C. the life boat was too heavy
D. the bypass to the cutout switch was misused by the crew 020 The lesson from this accident is that ________.
A. seafaring is not all about facing unforeseen situations B. it is not necessary to wear hard hats to prevent sore heads C. the wrong oil can not have serious repercussions
D. do not start lifeboat winch motors with the crank handle in place
Passage 1-6
During the morning of 2 August 1999 the supply vessel Putford Worker was working cargo at installations in the North Sea. She had completed operations at one installation without incident.
At 1110 she approached the second installation and carried out precautionary engine and steering tests. These were satisfactory, and at 1115 the vessel was in position to work cargo. The master was on the bridge at the joystick control; the weather was fine and the sea calm.
The first lift was a 10' x 8' container. The deck crew attached the hook of the installation's crane to the container, and moved forward to a safe position. The master then noticed that the vessel was moving forward out of position and moved the joystick to counteract the ahead movement. He then saw that the port propeller was indicating full ahead pitch, so changed from joystick to manual pitch controls and promptly put them to full astern. This did not prevent the vessel moving ahead so far that the attached container be dragged over the stern and into the sea. Placing the manual pitch controls to zero then caused both propellers to return to neutral. Control of the vessel was regained, and the problem did not immediately re-occur. Later tests and inspections by specialist control engineers and the propeller manufacturers showed no fault with the control systems or the port propeller. However, some wear was found in the feedback linkages on the control system of the starboard propeller. This was rectified, and manoeuvring tests completed satisfactorily.
021 In this passage the supply vessel is ________.
A. one that supplies fuel oils to other deep sea vessels B. one that supplies stores to other deep sea vessels C. a tug boat D. smaller container vessel 022 The joystick is a device ________.
A. controlling rudders B. controlling shore cranes
C. controlling the operation of cargoes D. controlling the propellers
023 On noticing that the vessel was moving forward out of position, the master ________. A. moved the joystick forward to go together with the ahead movement B. moved the shore crane to go aftward
C. made the container move aftward by operating the joystick
D. operated the joystick to control the vessel and move her aftward 024 It is clearly demonstrated that ________.
A. although the testing of engines and steering before working cargo at an installation found nothing, it is an
important precaution
B. the testing of engines and steering before working cargo at an installation was not followed by Putford
Worker
C. there is no value of moving the deck crew clear once a lift is attached
D. had the deck crew not bothered to move clear from, the consequences could have been avoided
Passage 1-7
The contract of carriage of goods by sea is usually concluded as between the shipper and the carrier, either directly or through their respective agents. Consequently, by virtue of the historic principle of privity of contract, only the shipper and the carrier have the right to take action against one another under the contract of carriage. The only clear exception to the rule was where the party having the right to sue assigned that right under a separate agreement to another party. On the other hand, when goods are sold (as they typically are) prior to shipment, the terms of sale generally result in the risk in the goods passing from the seller (the shipper) to the buyer (the consignee or endorsee, in the case of a bill of lading, or the party entitled to take delivery under a waybill) when the goods cross the ship's rail in the port of loading. Therefore, although the law recognizes that the shipper alone has the right to sue the carrier in contract for subsequent cargo loss or damage occurring while the carrier had charge of the shipment, the shipper is not usually the party who actually suffers that loss. Frequently, also, depending on the terms of sale, the shipper will no longer be the owner of the goods at the time when the loss or damage occurs, and so will be unable to sue the carrier in tort.
025 The contract of carriage of goods by sea is usually concluded as between ________. A. the seller and the buyer B. the shipper and the consignee or endorsee C. the carrier and the consignee or endorsee D. the shipper and the carrier 026 When goods are sold prior to shipment the risk in the goods passes ________. A. from the shipper to the carrier B. from the seller to the buyer C. from the carrier to the shipper D. from the buyer to the seller
027 It is concluded ________ that only the shipper and the carrier have the right to take action against one another
under the contract of carriage.
A. by maritime laws B. by a mainstay of the common law in particular
C. by virtue of the historic principle of privity of contract D. by shipping practice 028 When goods are sold prior to shipment the shipper ________.
A. is not usually the party who actually suffers the subsequent loss B. is usually the party who actually suffers the subsequent loss
C. will still be the owner of the goods at the time when the loss or damage occurs D. will be responsible for the loss of or damage to the cargo he shipped
Passage 1-8
The 56000gt OBO vessel Hyphestos arrived at the oil terminal in Malmo, Sweden, at about noon on 16 March 1998. Visibility was about 1 mile, there was no wind and the current was minimal. With an experienced pilot and his apprentice pilot embarked, and three tugs in attendance, Hyphestos entered the basin. The intention was to stop the ship, swing off the berth and go port side to, with the bow pointing seawards. The vessel was relatively large for the size of the basin.
The ship's bridge staff consisted of the master, second officer, a helmsman and a deckhand, when entering harbour. There were no technical or language difficulties. Once Hyphestos had stopped off the berth, the swing was started with the head tug pulling the bow to starboard, and the tractor tug aft pulling the stern to port. A third tug pushed on the starboard quarter. Towards the end of the manoeuvre, the stern tug found herself very close to a buoy marking the fairway, and in danger of damaging her towing cable. Her skipper informed the pilot of the problem, and was told to slacken the cable and \ With the turn nearly complete, Hyphestos was canted towards the jetty at an angle of about 45° and the bow some 200m off it. To close the distance, the pilot ordered \interpreted this as \ahead\She began to move ahead and the speed began to build up. The bow tug meanwhile continued to pull ahead, and by the time the vessel was some 40-50m off the jetty, and still heading for it, Hyphestos was making good about 2 knots. The predicament was realised, astern propulsion was ordered, the ahead tug changed her direction of tow to broad on the starboard bow. The stern tug which was still \along\rammed the jetty and two shore cranes.
029 Hyphestos originally intended to berth ________.
A. starboard side alongside with her bow pointing seaward B. starboard side alongside with her bow pointing inward C. port side alongside with her bow pointing inward D. port side alongside with her bow pointing seaward
030 The reason that the master interpreted \ A. he did not understand the pilot's language properly
B. he did not believe the pilot's orders at that particular moment
C. he suffered a heavy stress when handling such a big vessel into a smaller basin D. he intended to cause an accident to teach the pilot a lessen 031 The skipper is a ________.
A. captain B. C/O C. pilot D. helmsman
032 It can be concluded that there were ________ persons on the bridge when the accident occurs. A. 4 B. 5 C. 6 D. 7
Passage 1-9
Sealand Mercury, a 49,985gt container ship of 292m in length and maximum draught 12.5m, sailed from Trinity Container Terminal, Felixstowe, at 1343. The tide was flooding. Low water had been at 1104; the height of tide was now 1.8m. She had two tugs made fast, one on her starboard bow and another through her centre lead aft. The visibility was not good and had recently deteriorated to about 0.3 miles. A pilot was on board.
Due to the poor visibility and in accordance with Harwich Haven Authority guidelines, the duty VTS manager had closed up a fog watch pilot in the VTS centre. Other vessel movements were adjusted so that Sealand Mercury's passage to sea was unimpeded.
At 1406 she passed North Shelf buoy and was heading 152° with her engines propelling at dead slow ahead. She had already begun a slow turn to starboard having applied starboard helm at about 1403 when the heading had been 137°. The forward tug had been let go but the after one remained attached. Visibility had further deteriorated to about 0.2 miles.
At 1408, knowing that the vessel was not turning quickly enough, the pilot ordered slow ahead and, soon afterwards, half ahead. Sealand Mercury continued to turn too slowly, left the deepwater channel and probably first touched bottom at about 1410. The engines were increased to full ahead at 1411 in a final attempt to steer the vessel to starboard and out of danger. With little or no under keel clearance this was unsuccessful and at 1413 she came to a stop hard aground about 0.1 mile from Fort buoy with the ship's head 190°.The vessel was towed back into the channel at 1610 when the tide had risen sufficiently. Subsequent inspections revealed that she had not been damaged.
033 Sealand Mercury assisted by two tugs, ________.
A. one on her starboard aft and another through her centre lead forward B. one on her port bow and another through her centre lead forward C. one on her port bow and another through her centre lead aft
D. one on her starboard bow and another through her centre lead aft
034 VTS manager had used such efforts as adjusting other vessel movements ________. A. to clear the sea passage for Sealand Mercury
B. to impede Sealand Mercury from going outward in fog C. not to impede the tugs from assisting Sealand Mercury
D. to assist Sealand Mercury to speed up when she was making the turn 035 VTS fog watch pilot is ________.
A. an auto pilot employed to control the traffic around the station B. a pilot used at the station C. a manager D. a device for controlling the inward and outward traffic 036 ________ is not the lessen from this accident.
A. The limitations of the assisting tugs in fog must be considered.
B. Vessels should consider delaying their outward passage in the event of imminent dense fog.
C. Manoeuvring large vessels in poor visibility requires a detailed knowledge of the vessel's handling
characteristics
D. Large course alterations based on radar observation of a channel buoy in poor visibility does not tend to
result in \
Passage 1-10
At about 0854 on the 9 March 1999, the 9.96m fishing vessel Beverley Ann II collided with the Liberian registered Cypress Pass, a 42,447gt vehicle carrier. The wind was east-north-east force 4 to 5 with visibility at 1 to 2 miles but less in squalls.
Cypress Pass was on passage from Amsterdam to the River Tyne, and making good a speed of 15.7 knots on a course of 302° as she approached her anchorage off the Northumberland coast. The master, third officer and a lookout manned the bridge, and preparations were being made to anchor. The engine was on bridge control and the automatic pilot engaged.
The twin hulled, GRP (glass reinforced products) constructed, Beverley Ann II, crewed by the skipper and a deckhand, was trawling in an east-south-east direction at just over 2 knots. The skipper saw an echo appear on the
edge of his radar screen at a range of about 3 miles. Soon afterwards he saw a very large ship appear out of the murk on his starboard bow heading towards him. Aware that he was in danger of being run down, he stopped, and then reversed his two engines, but was unable to avoid colliding with the port bow of the larger vessel. It was a glancing blow and caused some minor damage.
The skipper of Beverley Ann II called the coastguard on VHF radio to tell them of the incident, and then called the ship.
The bridge team of Cypress Pass had been totally unaware of the entire incident.
037 Prior to the accident Cypress Pass's engine was ________.
A. on dead slow ahead B. stopped C. on bridge control D. engaged by auto pilot 038 Cypress Pass did not detect Beverley Ann II on he radar, because the latter is ________.
A. GRP constructed B. twin hulled C. crewed by the skipper and a deckhand D. fishing 039 Beverley Ann II is a ________.
A. vehicle carrier B. fishing boat C. coaster D. river boat 040 According to the passage, ________ is not correct.
A. Having assessed that risk of collision exists, a skipper should bear in mind that the other vessel might not
have detected his own.
B. When another vessel is detected on radar, especially as close as 3 miles, the instinctive reaction should be,
must be, to establish whether risk of collision exists.
C. The more notice a fishing vessel skipper can have of an approaching vessel the more likely he is to avoid a
close quarters encounter.
D. The officers and the lookout in Cypress Pass had seen the fishing vessel either on radar or visually, but
they failed to take any action for the prevention of the collision.
Passage 1-11
The 32,500gt container vessel Cap Blanco was in mid-Atlantic on passage from Europe when, at 1855, the automatic fire alarm system activated showing a fire in the accommodation on \found a fire in the cook's cabin. The ventilation to that area was stopped, with \deck below electrically isolated. At 1903, a fire party comprising the chief officer, cadet, and AB, all wearing self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) because of the thick smoke, tackled the fire. It was extinguished within a minute using two portable extinguishers; one water and the other CO2 . Ventilation was then restarted to clear the area of smoke to allow the cause to be investigated. Decks \head count taken of the crew; they were all found safe. A fire check in the area continued by taking down deckhead panels and checking the electrical circuits for damage. The area was declared clear at 2052. A new fire detector head was fitted in the cabin and electrical power restored. Fire extinguishers and SCBA air bottles were refilled.
The investigation found a rechargeable torch lying in a molten heap on the cook's cabin desk top with the remains of a stereo speaker fused to it. The wooden desk top was burnt under and around the torch and the bulkhead behind it was also damaged. The bulkhead electrical socket, into which a two pin charging lead for the torch was still inserted, was flame damaged as were adjacent book shelves and deckhead panelling. The supply cables to the socket had been burnt away. Despite heavy smoke damage to the cabin and bathroom, the fire had not penetrated into the void spaces above. The rechargeable torch had been bought in the UK from a reputable store just before departure. It was supplied with a charging transformer and a UK standard three-pin plug. Although the wiring was damaged, there was no evidence to indicate that the transformer adapter had caused the fire. Examination of the torch suggested that a short circuit in the torch's internal wiring was responsible.