the interests of the operator's option dampen their enthusiasm. Therefore, the price should be set at Excluding the impact of stock option system factors, overall economic fluctuations during dynamic exercise price is determined, enhance the effectiveness of incentive stock options.
2.2.2. The enterprise performance evaluation system is imperfect
Currently launched equity incentive program, the factors considered by the operator performance evaluation is not comprehensive, focused primarily on the evaluation of financial performance (using only the financial indicators), indicator is relatively simple, almost are ROE and net profit growth for the evaluation. Financial evaluation reflect only the results do not reflect the process will result in an excessive focus on the history of corporate management, and the lack of future performance prediction, one-sided pursuit of profitability temporarily obtain and maintain short-term financial results, contributing to its quick success and short-term speculative behavior . So that investors can not fully understand the business situation is not conducive to optimal allocation of capital, partly the result of excessive
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focus on financial performance of the enterprise, while ignoring relevant matters affecting the long-term development of enterprises. Therefore, in the assessment and evaluation of incentive targets should also be added to the non-financial indicators.
2.2.3 Equity Incentive mechanism is not perfect Internal governance structure of listed companies is a bit confusing, ownership of the property rights system resulting in the absence of confusion, a lot of executive directors of listed companies to participate in the decision-making of the Remuneration Committee, the Chairman of the Remuneration Committee led by the chairman or part-time parent, that the development of Executive Incentive Plan members of the \Committee\overlap with senior executives enjoy incentives, in essence, become his own incentive to develop their own standards.
Makers with the incentive target equity incentive plan no separation, coupledwith the lack of effective supervision of shareholders, resulting in a lower equity incentive threshold, executives were generally enjoy the incentive, equity incentive becomes a disguised equity dividends. In the design
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of the exit mechanism and associated restrictions on the more relaxed, equity incentive shorter validity period, executives in the short term will be able to get a lot of benefits through exercise, a phenomenon with a long-term equity incentives contrary, so China's listed companies equity incentive plan for internal constraints useless.
3、The shares of listed companies the incentive problem solving strategies
3.1 Improve the corporate governance structure
Corporate governance is imperfect, the introduction of equity incentive under \their own salary for a given situation stocks, damage to the company and shareholders interests inevitable. Sound corporate governance structure of listed companies is an important basis for the healthy operation of the system, but also the role of equity incentives necessary condition for the establishment of an independent director system, supervisory board on major issues of personnel, payroll, and other strategic decisions of legality, impartiality, independence; set up a board system to ensure that the overall interests of the internal corporate governance-related decision-making
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level, the Board of Directors for the company, but also to ensure the supervision of the management of the Executive Board of the effectiveness of decision-making and more; the establishment of internal control system, the business activities of the enterprise to effectively control ; set up an audit committee system of internal financial operation mechanism effectively regulated. In order to avoid the Supervisory Board and board personnel due to the long \so that constraint failure, the Board of Supervisors should adopt the rotation system, every three years or five years to conduct a personnel adjustments.
3.2 Improve the independent director system
China's listed companies are hired basically independent directors of listed company's internal business play a supervisory role, but the time of the introduction of the independent director system is short, various ancillary systems and the external environment is not perfect, to a certain extent, restricted its full play. Many companies are major shareholders or management proposed by the independent director candidates to the Board, on behalf of the board of directors nominated again, this mechanism is difficult to
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guarantee the nomination of independent directors independent of the major shareholders and management, independent directorsindividual independence and the independence of the whole affected, resulting in weakening of the board control. There are a lot of independent directors lack experience in corporate management, are not familiar with the operation of the enterprise, it is difficult to assume the important task of supervising the business operation, but also for a variety of considerations listed companies, try not to provide less detrimental to the company's offer information, even deliberately not notified of independent directors to attend board meetings, causing the independent directors can not get enough information, resulting in right of independent directors is difficult to be assured that it is difficult to play its role.
3.3 The implementation of the concept of corporate culture Incentive
3.3.1 Shaping corporate culture inspired by the spirit. Corporate culture is the sum of the spirit of enterprise culture, institutional culture and material culture, is suitable for the characteristics of the philosophy of the
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