好像立法只针对或认为只能有这一份保单一样。所以，劳合社一直不肯放弃或更改这份旧的劳合社保单。至于针对船货分家与专业化的发展，劳合社的做法就是去拟订各种有个别针对性的标准条文。例如，有一套标准条文针对货物保险，其中有再去分开承保的是一切险或只是全损，等。另有一套标准条文针对船舶保险，其中又去分开承保的是一个航次还是一段时间。这一来，如果是船东投保一段时间的船壳险，就把一份劳合社保单加上一套专门针对的标准条文（Institute Time Clauses [Hull]）。如果是货方投保一船货的一切险，也就是把一份劳合社保单加上一套专门针对的标准格式条文（Institute Cargo Clauses [All Risks]）。如果两份文件产生冲突，显然就是专门针对的标准条文超越劳合社保单。
至于投保战争险，这就更加麻烦了。它在劳合社保单先去加上了一条所谓的“Free of Capture and Seizure Clause”（或简称F.C & S Clause）去把劳合社保单内的战争险全部排除，变了承保的只剩下了水险。在1899年开始分开水险与战争险承保的时候，这一条F.C & S Clause是以附加条文的形式去加在劳合社保单内。但后来决定去以斜体（italics）印在劳合社保单内，并名为首要条文。另是劳合社保单去加上一条有关条文/文字之间起矛盾的分量轻重高低，说：（1）首要条文（Paramount clause），不论其为手写、打印或印制在保单上，其效力都是最高；（2）手写的文字；（3）打印的文字；（4）印制在保单中或单独印制贴在保单上的协会条文；（5）脚注条文（Marginal clauses）。
上述只是去介绍怎样把战争险排除，没有介绍怎样去投保。做法上就是以一份劳合社保单，然后把F.C & S Clause删除掉，然后去加上一套专门针对战争险的标准条文。反正是这样来来去去，产生了不少的漏洞与导致很多著名的诉讼。光是F.C & S Clause，本来就简单的一句，如下：
“Warranty free of capture, seizure and detention, and the consequences thereof, or any attempt thereat, piracy excepted, and also from all consequences of hostilities or warlike operations, whether before or after declaration of war.”。
但通过很多昂贵的诉讼，该条文不断改良变了最后的版本是：
“Warranty free of capture, seizure and detention, and the consequences thereof, or any attempt thereat; also from the consequences of hostilities or warlike operations, whether before or after declaration of war or not; but this warranty shall not exclude collision, contact with any fixed or floating object (other than a mine or torpedo), stranding, heavy weather or fire unless caused directly (and independently of the nature performing) by a hostile act by or against a belligerent power; and for the purpose of this warranty ?power‘ includes any authority maintaining naval, military or air forces in association with a power.
Further warranted free from the consequences of civil war, revolution, rebellion, insurrection, or civil strife arising therefrom, or piracy.”。
这种含糊的保单是要像笔者那样经过多年的研究才会勉强知道到底承保的是一些什么风险，难怪这导致了联合国贸发局在1975年的大力抨击，并声称英国不肯随着时代的进步作出修改，贸发局就自己去拟订一份大家（特别是发展中国家）都看得明白的保单：UNCTAD文件TD/B/C/14/1SL/27。而英国法院自己的批评也不少，如Mocatta大法官在The ―Anita‖ (1970) 2 Lloyd‘s Rep. 365中说：
“It cannot be beyond the wit of Underwriters and those who advise them in this age of law reform to devise more straightforward and easily comprehended terms of cover.”。
另在Kuwait Airways v. Kuwait Insce (1999) 1 Lloyd‘s Rep.803中，Hobhouse勋爵也有说： “An example of this approach in the marine market is the treatment of war risks. Historically the ?S.G‘ policy (as scheduled to the 1906 Act) covers war risks but these risks are then excluded by the F.C. & S. clause. This approach over the years gave rise to many disputes many of which could have been avoided had a more direct approach been adopted. The historical approach has been departed from in many sectors but its influence is still to be observed in the contracts which your Lordship‘s House has to consider on the present appeal.”。
以上的介绍已经是过时，因为英国的保险市场很快就对联合国贸发局的批评给出一一回应，并在1982、1983年作出相应的对策，拟订了专门针对不同种类保险的标准条文并且放弃了劳合社保单。
这种拟订得差劲的标准格式合约也不光是保单，在Beaufort Developments (NI) Ltd v. Gilbert-Ash NI Ltd (1999) AC 266先例，Lloyd勋爵就批评了岸上建造合约的JCT标准格式，说：“Standard forms of building contract have often been criticized by the courts for being unnecessarily obscure and verbose.”。
另Hoffman勋爵也说：“I have no wish to add to the anthology of adverse comments on the drafting of the JCT Standard Form Contract.”。
看来，经常在使用的标准格式合约也是有好坏之分，更不用说是一些由很懂与精明的商业人士相对由不懂合约法加上考虑不周全的人士所拟订的合约，更是好坏会有天渊之别。
最后去节录Denning大法官在British Movietonews Ltd v. London and District Cinemas Ltd (1951) 1 KB 190 CA.先例中所说：
“The day is done when we can excuse an unforeseen injustice by saying to the sufferer ?It is your own folly. You ought not to have passed that form of words. You ought to have put in a
clause to protect yourself.‘ We no longer credit a party with the foresight of a prophet or his lawyer with the draftsmanship of a Chalmers.”。
但这说法被贵族院推翻：British Movietonews Ltd v. London and District Cinemas Ltd (1952) AC 166。
9 明显不完整的条文
合约中有不完整的条文也经常遇到，不完整的原因往往是双方订约的时候没有想到。如果这不完整是在一份合约，而漏掉的内容十分重要，这会导致合约被视为是还没有成立，因为是无法履行或因为太不肯定而无效（unworkable or void for uncertainty）。这种不完整的合约在《Chitty on Contracts》一书第29版之2-110段有说：
“Agreement in principle only. Parties may reach agreement on essential matters of principle, but leave important points unsettled so that their agreement is incomplete. It has, for example, been held that there was no contract where an agreement for a lease failed to specify the date on which the term was to commence; and that an agreement for sale of land by installments was not a binding contract where it provided for conveyance of ?a proportionate part‘ as each installment of the price was paid, but failed to specify which part is to be conveyed on each payment. An agreement is also incomplete if it expressly provides that it is ?subject to‘ the resolution of specified points; there is no contract in such a case until either those points are resolved or the parties agree that their resolution is no longer necessary for the agreement to enter into contractual force.”。
但笔者在这里是去针对另一种情况，就是合约内的个别条文是明显的不完整。而双方都承认有一个有效的合约或是已经在履行该合约。这一来，一种马上想到的最常见的救济办法就是把不完整的地方以默示条文来填补。由于默示是需要该合约必须去这样做以填补这个漏洞，所以不一定在每个情况都可以这样做。另一种救济办法就会是根据合约的本质与目标，加上其他条文的整体考虑去说这样才是他们一定会有的订约意图，虽然他们没有想到。这在Bromarin v. IMD Investment (1999) STC 301, CA.先例中Chadwick大法官这样说：
“It is not, to my mind, an appropriate approach to construction to hold that, where the parties contemplated event ?A‘, and they did not contemplate events ?B‘. The lack of the court is to decide in the light of the agreement that the parties made, what they must have been taken to have intended to the event, event ?B‘, which they did not contemplate. That is, of course, an artificial exercise, because it requires there to be attributed to the parties an intention which they did not have (as a matter of fact) because they did not appreciate the problem which needed to be addressed. But it is an exercise which the courts have been willing to undertake for as long as commercial contracts have come before them for construction.”。
10 含糊（ambiguity）
合约条文/文字如果有两个或以上的解释，这就表示有含糊的地方。如果它没有办法通过各种解释规则去给一个准确的意思，这就会令合约无效或有关条文变得太不肯定而无效了。
通常，含糊的合约条文/文字不代表很难去找出正确的解释，正如Wilberforce勋爵在L Schuler AG v. Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd (1974) A.C. 235, HL中所说的： “ambiguity in this context is not to be equated with difficulty of construction, even difficulty to a point where judicial opinion as to meaning had differed.”。
而有了法院权威性的解释，这就会令含糊消失，这也是Wilberforce勋爵在Ailsa Craig Fishing Co Ltd v. Malvern Fishing Ltd (1983) 1 WLR 964, HL中所说的：“The possibility of construction of a clause does not amount to ambiguity: that disappears after the court has pronounced the meaning.”。
很早以前就已经把含糊区分为两种，（一）是表面含糊（patent ambiguity）；（二）是潜在含糊（latent ambiguity）。这在Saunderson v. Piper (1839) 5 Bing. N.C. 425中所说的： “This is a case of ambiguitas patens, and according to the rules of law, evidence is not admissible. Where there is doubt on the face of the instrument the law admits no extrinsic evidence to explain it.”。
简单介绍是，表面含糊针对的是光看文书合约的表面就已经可以见到。但潜在含糊只能去看了其他的外来证据，是文书合约的四个角（four corners）以外的证据才会显示出来。要这样去区分的原因已经从上述的节录可见，就是有关外来证据可否被法院接受的问题。在表面含糊的情况下，是不准引入外来证据/口头证据。但针对潜在含糊就有不同对待。这里的原因也不必再去细究，因为现在的法律已经有了改变，即使没有含糊的情况下也已经放开并去接受外来证据/口头证据，更加不会理会是哪一种的含糊。正如Steyn勋爵在Pepper v. Hart; A Re-examination (2001) 21 OJLS 59所说：
“Language is a labyrinth. As in ordinary life, words in a legal text cannot be understood except in relation to the circumstances in which they are used. It is sometimes assumed by judges that the existence of an ambiguity is a precondition to admitting evidence of the context of a legal text. That is wrong. Language can never be understood divorced from its context.”。
所以，已经有权威说法是不必再去理会表面或是潜在的含糊。笔者在这里一提主要还是有不少书提到这些说法，所以要去涉及。这可去节录Simon勋爵在L Schuler AG v.
Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd (1974) A.C. 235, HL先例中所说：“the distinctions between patent ambiguities, latent ambiguities and equivocations as regards admissibility of extrinsic evidence are based on outmoded and highly technical and artificial rules and introduce absurd refinements.”。
另也有说法是“ambiguity”与“vagueness”这两个字也有一定的区别，但在现实中其实是不必去理会。
11不肯定（uncertainty）
不肯定会导致整个合约或个别条文变为无效，已经在上一段提到过。但由于去漠视或否定双方订约所选用的文字会有危险是法官/仲裁员去重写（rewrite）他们的合约，所以会尽量找出一个解释。这一种心态有很多先例提到过，可去部分节录如下：
在Greater London Council v. Connolly (1970) 2 Q.B.100先例中Denning勋爵说道：“The courts are always loath to hold a condition bad for uncertainty. They will give it a reasonable meaning wherever possible.”。
Pearson勋爵也说：“… the courts are always loath to hold a clause bad for uncertainty if reasonable meaning can be given to it, and it seems to me easy to give a reasonable meaning to this clause.”。
在Re Lloyd‘s Trust Instruments (unreported, June 24, 1970 )一案中，Megarry大法官说： “I think the starting point on any question of uncertainty must be that of the court‘s reluctance to hold an instrument void for uncertainty. Lord Hardwicke L.C. once said: ?A court never construes a devise void, unless it is so absolutely dark that they cannot find out the testator‘s meaning‘: Minshull v. Minshull (1737) 1 Atk. 411. Lord Brougham said: ?The difficulty must be so great that it amounts to an impossibility, the doubt so grave that there is not even an inclination of the scales one way‘: Doe d. Winter v. Perratt. In a well-known statement, Sir George Jessel M.R. said that the court would not hold a will void for uncertainty ?unless it is impossible to put a fair meaning on it. The duty of the court is to put a fair meaning on the terms used, and not, as was said in one cae, to repose upon the easy pillow of uncertainty‘: In re Roberts (1881) 19 Ch.D. 520. That this is not a doctrine confined to wills but is one which applies to other instruments, such as planning permissions is shown by cases such as Fawcett Properties Ltd v. Buckingham County Council (1961) A.C. 636, where by a majority, the Delphic language of a condition in a planning permission escaped from being held void for uncertainty largely because of its resemblance to a section in a modern Act of Parliament.”。