Changes in the Market That Affected Auditor Independence
Jonathan Weil， in “Behind Ways of Corporate Fraud: A Change in How Auditors Work” (The Wall Street Journal， March 25， 2004)， suggests that during the 1970s and 1980s the market for audit services and the way in which audits were conducted changed， contributing to a decline in auditor independence。 The first component of change was price competition。 Prior to the 1970s， the AICPA Code of Conduct prohibited auditors frompublicly advertising their services， from making uninvited solicitations to rival firms’ clients， and from participating in competitive bidding for audits。 Under threats of antitrust action by the federal government， the AICPA was compelled to remove these prohibitions against competitive practices。 As a result， competitive bidding in auditing became commonplace。
The second change in how audits were conducted was an increased emphasis on “risk-based auditing。” Risk-based auditing is reasonable in that the largest amount of audit effort is placed on the greatest areas of audit risk。 This logical idea assumes， however， that auditors are experts in determining the riskiest areas of a company’s operations。 Unfortunately， as Enron and other business failures have demonstrated， some auditors are not sufficiently able to determine which areas of a company’s operations are subject to the greatest risks。 In addition， auditors using a risk-based approach might not detect fraudulent activities。 While this new concept of auditor independence may be appropriate for an auditor in certain circumstances， too often an auditor’s efforts to aid management resulted in misleading accounting numbers that concealed true economic performance。 During the 1990s， it appeared that some auditors neglected their most immediate responsibility to act on behalf of third-party investors or， at a minimum， to be an objective and neutral interpreter of accounting standards。
Pre–Sarbanes-Oxley Proposals to Enhance Auditor Independence
A legal prohibition against an auditor possessing a financial interest in a client has been the cornerstone of auditor independence rules in the United States since the 1930s。 Until the 1990s， this was not necessarily true in the United Kingdom and some other countries， even though prohibitions against holding financial interests were generally observed in practice because of the standards of the accounting
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institutes and common law。
Currently， a prohibition against auditors possessing financial interests in clients is virtually a universal principle。 Both the SEC and the public accounting profession have focused most of their attention regarding auditor independence on defining and enforcing prohibitions against financial interests。 Elaborate rules and reporting structures have been formulated for the purpose of revealing any type of financial interest on the part of professional employees of accounting firms， their spouses， their parents， or their children。 The PCAOB has adopted most of these rules， with a degree of relaxation in areas where the rules seemed unreasonable。Rotation of audit appointments。 In several countries (e。g。， Italy) auditors are permitted to audit a client for only a specified number of years。 This type of regulation has never been seriously considered in the U。S。 or the U。K。， although Sarbanes-Oxley requires that individual auditors rotate off a client on a periodic basis。 In France， the concept of auditor rotation is reversed: Auditors are appointed for a fixed period of time， during which time they cannot be replaced。 This rule was intended to increase auditor independence， because the auditor has less fear of being fired by the client。
With regard to independence standards， the PCAOB has adopted interim rule 3600T as part of its bylaws and rules。 Rule 3600T reads as follows:
In connection with the preparation or issuance of any audit report， a registered public accounting firm， and its associated persons， shall comply with independence standards:
(a) as described in the AICPA’s Code of Professional Conduct Rule 101， and interpretations and rulings thereunder， as in existence on April 16， 2003 [AICPA Professional Standards， ET sections 101 and 191 (AICPA 2002)]， to the extent not superseded or amended by the Board;
(b) Standards Nos。 1， 2， and 3， and Interpretations 99-1， 00-1， and 00-2， of the Independence Standards Board， to the extent not superseded or amended by the Board。
Essentially， the PCAOB has recognized the independence standards previously developed by the AICPA and the SEC through the Independence Standards Board。
Reconsidering Auditor Independence
What is needed now is a complete reconsideration of the concept of auditor
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independence。 Such reconsideration might lead to a new concept in which auditor independence would be based on reasserting the accounting profession’s former ethic of being an objective and neutral interpreter of accounting standards， rather than an advocate for client positions。 Given the recent and ongoing accounting and auditing scandals， it seems obvious that independent auditors should not be advocates for client positions。
A new concept of auditor independence is required that specifically incorporates the propositions that: 1) auditors should not be advocates for their clients， and 2) management should not be able to influence the audit fee and the scope of the audit。 Without a transition to this concept， auditor independence standards will most likely be primarily cosmetic and will not provide sufficient assurance that auditors are in fact independent from client management。
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附录二
变化中的会计师审计独立性——与当前环境与时俱进
理查德·贝克
2005年8月——作为《注册会计师专刊》的主编罗伯特科尔森在他2004年3月的专栏里的研究表明，“会计师审计的独立性”的概念，在过去的150多年中，是不断变化的。一般来说，会计师审计的独立性与当前的商业环境是存在着密切的关联的。但是，不同的“会计师审计的独立性”的概念之间，并没有明显的过渡。通常情况下，许多审计的独立性的不同概念的提出，都是围绕着专业的会计师、审计师、监管机构和一般公众之间的独立性，所展开讨论的。
会计师审计的独立性的最初概念，出现在19世纪。它的出现，是基于这样一个前提的，即主要是英国本土的专业会计师和审计师，对整个大英帝国以前的和现有的殖民资本承担监督的责任。在此期间，数量上相对来说较少的会计师事务所，却要对相对来说大数量的群体执行审计的任务。这些专业的会计师和审计师就有可能同时对不同的实体出具财务报告、为不同的投资群体工作。
在这个时代，会计师审计独立性的概念，并没有把审计设想为一个独立存在的审计实体;英国投资者明确禁止审计者在其审计的企业工作或参与投资。与此同时，只要会计师保持对主要投资者的审计服务，他们的专业会计服务的范围，是可以合理地扩大的。例如，审计师被允许可以帮他们所审计的企业编制财务报表。
会计师审计的独立性这一初步的概念在19世纪末到20世纪初发生了改变。在这段时期，经济上有了一个大的变化，那就是资本的主要来源由国内市场转向到外国资本市场。这一变化的出现是与美国的大型工业公司，如采矿，铁路，能源，电力和电信，的出现相关联的。伴随着这些美国大公司的出现的，也包括着对公司商业性的理解的改变。在上世纪30年代，经济学家阿道夫贝尔和伽尔迪纳指出，推进对这一变化的理解的，是大型企业所有权的分离，以及会计和审计对于公司的财产权益的重要性。在这一新思路下，审计的主要职责，就是为集体的所有权益的需要而服务，而不
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是某个具体的无所有权的利益。这种集体的所有权益，基本上是由国内的股东组成，通常往往是大银行或非常富有的投资者。
联邦证券法在新政时代的通过，以及美国证券交易委员会的成立，使会计师审计的独立性的概念，有了再一次的转变。美国证券交易委员会的成立，对建立出具财务报告和审计法规的标准，有着最重要的影响。通过这种努力，公共的会计师和审计师不再认为他们的主要职责，是为那些特定的物主，或某些集体的所有权益；而是按照一套既定的专业标准，来编制财务报表，和进行财务决算的审计工作。会计师审计的独立性的概念，转向为在财务状况和经营业绩的报告中保持客观性和中立性，而不是忠于某一政党。这一观点，由西澳佩顿教授，在理论上和书面上被阐述出来，他着重强调了公司财务报表的重要性。
会计师审计独立性的客观和中立的概念，一直趋于上风，成为主流。直到20世纪70年代，当财务会计准则委员会成立，成为独立的、权威的会计标准制定者。大约从那个时候开始，公共的会计公司开始改变其客观和中立的原则，并开始对他们的审计客户宣传和提供关于会计和审计的事项。同时，在全球范围内，企业的快速增长，为公共的会计师事务所提供了大量的机会去获得收入，而这些收入，远远超过了传统的审计服务所能取得的收入。虽然，美国注册会计师协会的审计准则委员会（ASB），发布的审计标准，一直继续强调着与客户保持独立性，但是日益激烈的审计服务市场的竞争，以及错综复杂的国际商业惯例，导致一些审计者不得不违反会计准则的客观性和中立性的，因为这更有利于赢得客户的信赖。
继2000年初的会计和审计丑闻之后，以及2002年沙宾法案的通过，审计者被认为是值得信赖的顾问的这种想法，似乎已经越来越难以让人信服。一个潜在的会计师审计的独立性的新概念，仍然未能演变出来，但上市公司会计监督委员会（ PCAOB ）对这种独立性的概念上，似乎更强调要在更大程度上区分注册审计师和客户管理的独立性。
会计师审计独立性的早期争议
在20世纪的下半叶，学术界和出现了关于会计师审计独立性的各种争论和专业文献。有一些关于会计师审计独立性的观点，是从包括英国和美国两者的会计职业相关的历史性观点中理想化、发展和演变出来的。例如，托马斯李，在《公司
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