的一个原因是太间接也太遥远。再多去举一个例子，如果船舶与船上的货物在航次中失踪，原因不明，这会是水险或者战争险，因为出事的地点是在天气恶劣的水域，而出事的时间是在第一次世界大战期间并且有很多德国潜艇出没。这种情况因为通信的发达与科技的进步现在已很少发生，但还是会存在并会带来向保险人索赔的困难，因为无法去证明是承保的风险是造成损失的近因：The ―Popi M‖ (1985) 2 Lloyd‘s Rep. 1。
4.1 以前判例有关损失的近因是在时间方面
在早期所判的案例，去找出损失的近因主要的考虑是在时间方面。也就是时间上越接近损失的原因就被视为是近因，然后看它是否是属于承保的风险。这里可举Hamilton, Fraser & Co v. Pandorf & Co (1887) LR 12 App Cas 518 (HL)。这是一个租约与提单的争议，有关的货物是一船的大米去英国的利物浦。航程中，由于船上的老鼠把一个管道咬了个洞而导致海水涌入把大米浸泡而引起货损。租约中有一条免责条文，说明船东对海上风险免责。这就要弄明白大米损害的近因是什么，因为如果是海上风险（perils of sea），船东是免责；如果近因是老鼠，船东就要负责，因为租约中根本没有对老鼠造成的损害免责，甚至还可以涉及了船舶不适货的问题。
这问题的复杂性可以去假设如果是老鼠将大米偷吃造成货损的话，船东明显是不能免责，因为造成损失的原因只有一个就是老鼠。但如果老鼠将船舶的管道咬了个洞导致海水涌入，就涉及了海上风险，因为海上风险的定义是相当广泛，只要是一些海上独有的风险（peculiar to the sea）。试想，如果在岸上老鼠将仓库咬了个洞，就不会造成同样的损失。而且，老鼠也不会是船上才会有。正如Esher勋爵在该先例所说：―But rats do not come from the sea, and are not generated by the sea. They are no more a difficulty on board ship than they are in a warehouse or in a mill.‖。这里也可以换一个角度看，就算是老鼠是造成货损的有效原因（effective cause），但海上风险在时间上是最近的原因（immediate cause）。而在该先例中贵族院判造成货损的近因是海上风险，所以船东免责。在这一个先例可以去看到时间上最接近造成损失的原因会是被视为近因，而且也不只是在保险的争议，因为这一个先例是租约的纠纷。涉及保险的话，是要从时间上找出最接近损失发生的原因，而且是更严格。
这可多举几个以前的先例说明是时间上最接近损失发生的原因被视为是近因，第一个先例是Taylor v. Dunbar (1869) LR 4 CP 206。货物是一船的牛肉，由于坏天气导致航次延长而变质，结果被丢到大海里去。法院判保险人不需要赔偿，因为损失的近因是延误（delay），而不是坏天气。而延误根据1906年《英国海上保险法》之Section 55(2)(b)规定：―Unless the policy otherwise provides, the
insurer on ship or goods is not liable for any loss proximately caused by delay, although the delay be caused by a peril insured against‖保险人是不用赔付。
第二个先例是Pink v. Fleming (1890) 25 QBD 396涉及了一船水果（桔子与柠檬），船舶在半途发生撞船，船舶并没有沉没或对水果造成损害。但碰撞造成船舶损坏，需要修理才能继续该航次，而修理期间也需要把水果卸到岸上，暂时存放。这延误造成了部分水果的损害。但上诉庭依从Taylor v. Dunbar的判法，认为损失的近因不是撞船而是延误。
第三个先例并非是海上保险：Lawrence v. The Accidental Insurance Company (Ltd) (1880-81) LR 7 QBD 216。这是一个有关人身伤亡的保险合约，承保的就是意外造成的伤亡，不保的就是受保人突然晕倒（fits）。受保人在火车车轨上突然晕倒之后火车驶过将受保人轧死。法院判保险人要负责，因为突然晕倒并非是死亡的直接近因（the proximate and immediate cause of death），火车驶过才是死亡的直接近因。
去总结说，特别是针对保险，以前针对近因主要的强调就是时间的先后。这可去节录Willes 大法官在先例Ionides v. Universal Marine Insurance Co (1863) 14 C.B.N.S. 259说：―The ordinary rule of insurance law is that … you are not to trouble yourself with distant cause, or to go into a metaphysical distinction between causes efficient and material and causes final; but you are to look exclusively to the proximate and immediate cause of the loss…‖
另在Leyland Shipping v. Norwich Union (1918) AC 350 (HL)，在双方代表大律师的争辩中，Leslie Scott勋爵更明确的说―…according to English law, the last cause only must be regarded and the others rejected, although they contributed to the result.‖
4.2 后来判例有关损失的近因是在重要性与有效性方面
但近因从时间上最接近损失的原因在英国法院有了不同的看法，就是去寻找什么是最主要（predominant）与有效（efficient）的原因造成的损失，这是在Leyland Shipping v. Norwich Union (1918) AC 350 (HL)。案情涉及承保的船舶―Ikaria‖在第一次世界大战期间，1915年的1月30日，在离目的港法国勒阿弗尔港（Le Havre）还有25海里处，被德国潜艇发射的鱼雷击中，并造成严重损坏，第一货舱全部进水，海水也同时进入第二货舱。通过拖船的救助，总算把船舶拖进勒阿弗尔港并挂靠泊位。如果船舶能够在泊位停留并进行修理，船舶可以说是安全。但在第二天，即1月31日，勒阿弗尔港受到飓风的袭击，导致船舶不断与
泊位碰撞。港口当局担心该船在泊位处沉没，而该泊位对军事用途起到重要作用，所以命令船舶必须离开去外锚地搁浅或在防波堤抛锚。这最终导致船舶在2月1日折断，变成全损。船东以海上灾难提出索赔，但贵族院判是战争险而不是水险的保险人负责，因为船舶被鱼雷击中后从来没有脱离严重的风险。贵族院也提到了发生时间上的远近（飓风在近，鱼雷在远）并非是决定性的，真正有效与最重要的原因造成最后的损失才算是近因。Shaw勋爵这样说：
―I will venture to remark that one must be careful not to lay the accent upon the word ?proximate‘ in such a sense as to lose sight of or destroy altogether the idea of cause itself. The true and the overruling principle is to look at a contract as a whole and to ascertain what the parties to it really meant. What was it which brought about the loss, the event, the calamity, the accident? …
To treat proxima causa as the cause which is nearest in time is out of the question. Causes are spoken of as if they were as distinct from one another as beads in a row or links in a chain, but—if this metaphysical topic has to be referred to –it is not wholly so. The chain of causation is a handy expression, but the figure is inadequate. Causation is not a chain, but a net. At each point influences, forces, events, precedent and simultaneous, meet; and the radiation from each point extends indefinitely. At the point where these various influences meet it is for the judgment as upon a matter of fact to declare which of the causes thus joined at the point of effect was the proximate and which was the remote cause.
What does ?proximate‘ here mean? To treat proximate cause as if it was the cause which is proximate in time is, as I have said, out of the question. The cause which is truly proximate is that which is proximate in efficiency. That efficiency may have been preserved although other causes may meantime have sprung up which have not yet destroyed it, or truly impaired it, and it may culminate in a result of which it still remains the real efficient cause to which the even can be ascribed.‖
Shaw勋爵也解释了为什么船舶被鱼雷击中才是近因：
―In my opinion the real efficient cause of the sinking of this vessel was that she was torpedoed. Where an injury is received by a vessel, it may be fatal or it may be cured: it has to be dealt with. In so dealing with it there may, it is true, be attendant circumstances which may aggravate or possibly precipitate the result, but which are incidents flowing from the injury, or receive from it an operative and disastrous power.
The vessel, in short, is all the time in the grip of the casualty. The true and efficient cause never loses its hold. The result is produced, a result attributable in common language to the casualty as a cause, and this result, proximate as well as continuous in its efficiency, properly meets, whether under contract or under the statue, the language of the expression ?proximately caused‘.‖
除了是要找出最主要与最有效的原因作为近因外，英国法院也有强调在一连串的事实中找近因，也必须是用一个符合普通人正常思维去全面看待（broad common sense view of the whole position）。在Canada Rice Mills v. Union Marine Insurance Company Ltd (1940) 67 Ll.L. Rep. 549中Wright勋爵是这样说：―Causation is to be understood as the man in the street, and not as either the scientist or the metaphysician, would understand it. Cause here means what a business or seafaring man would taken to be the cause without too microscopic analysis but on a broad view.‖
在Wayne Tank & Pump v. Employers‘ Liability (1973) 2 Lloyd‘s Rep 237，Denning勋爵总结说：―Since Leyland’s case it has been settled in insurance law that the ?cause‘ of a loss is that which is the effective or dominant cause of the occurrence, or, as it is sometimes put, that which is in substance the cause, even though it is more remote in point of time, such cause to be determined by common sense, see Gray v. Barr (1971) 2 Lloyd‘s Rep., at p. 5.‖
这些改变带来后来很不一样的判法：P. Samuel &Co. v. Dumas （1924）A.C. 431; 18 Ll.L. Rep 200，案情涉及了船舶因为船东故意去把海阀打开让海水涌进来造成船舶沉没，显然这是一个典型人为凿沉船舶想去骗保险金的案件。该案例的原告也不是欺诈的船东，他已经是失了踪，原告是贷款给船东的无辜方（mortgagee）。原告指称造成船舶全损的近因是海上风险，而船东的恶意行为（willful misconduct）只是遥远的原因。显然从时间上来看这是站的住脚，因为船东的恶意行为时间上是更早，他把海阀打开导致海水涌进时间上是比较晚，这可去看先例Hamilton, Fraser & Co v. Pandorf & Co (1887) LR 12 App Cas 518 (HL)，就可以看到两个案件在事实上的相通之处。但由于法院在Leyland Shipping v. Norwich Union (1918) AC 350 (HL)针对近因有了不同的强调，再也不会强调时间的先后而是强调主要与有效的原因，所以在先例P. Samuel &Co. v. Dumas，贵族院判近因是船东的恶意行为（wickedness of man），而1906年《英国海上保险法》之Section 55 (2)(a)说明是除非保险合约有明示规定，是不保受保人的恶意行为。在该先例后直到现在，贷款给船东的人士或银行都会去投保一种名为―贷款人利益保险‖（mortgagee interests insurance）的保险，明示约定该保险承保的风险是船东的恶意行为。可以说遇到同样的情况，无辜的银行也不会
受到损害。但要做出赔付的是―贷款人利益保险‖的保险人，而不是船东所投的水险保险合约或战争险保险合约的保险人。因为船舶全损的近因就是船东的恶意行为而不是其他有效与重要的原因造成。
在上一段也提到了Taylor v. Dunbar (1869) LR 4 CP 206与Pink v. Fleming (1890) 25 QBD 396的先例，但在针对如何找出近因有了不同的强调后，估计判法也有了很大的不同。这里可以去举一个相应不同的看法，虽然它是一个美国先例，名为Lanasa Fruit Steamship & Importing Co. Inc. v. Universal Insurance Company (The Smaragd) (1938) AMC 1。案情是一船的香蕉腐烂，原因是由于船舶搁浅导致的延误。美国最高院判损失的近因是船舶搁浅，这是承保的风险。美国最高院依从先例Leyland Shipping v. Norwich Union (1918) AC 350 (HL)，而不接受从时间的先后找近因的说法。
4.3 根据不同案件的事实找出近因与大致分类
可以说在大部分的保险案件在全面了解事实后，都能客观找出事故与损失的近因。但由于每个案件都会有不同的事实，所以导致有很多这方面的争议都涉及昂贵的诉讼。而且，判决也有一定程度的不稳定，正如《Chalmers Marine Insurance Act 1906》第9版78页所说：―though the rule （指近因的说法）is universally admitted, lawyers have never attempted to work out any philosophical theory of cause and effect, and it is probably as well for commerce that they have never made the attempt. The numerous decisions on the rule are rough and ready applications of it to particular facts. As might be expected, many of the decisions are difficult to reconcile. But the apparent inconsistencies may be regarded as depending rather on inferences of fact than on matters of law.‖
但大致上还是可以去把它分为3类(英文的名称是根据Robert Merkin教授《Colinvaux‘s Law of Insurance in Hong Kong》2009年版) ：
4.3.1．前因造成无可避免损失的案件（inevitable cases）
这第一个类别可以这样来解释，就是前后有2个原因造成最后的损失，但第一个原因可以说是一个致命的一击（death blow），而客观去看后来的原因也难以去改变最后损失的命运。在这种情况下，很简单是前因就是近因。这一类别可以Leyland Shipping v. Norwich Union (1918) AC 350 (HL)作为典型的例子，该船舶被水雷击中后，从来没有脱离危险，后来的飓风导致船舶全损，可以说后来飓风的出现并没有太多改变船舶的命运。类似的情况也可以另外一个假象的例子说明，就是该船舶被水雷击中后被拖带去一个港口避难。由于船舶失去动