上保险最典型就是纵火。把近因原则去扩大就可以在受保人作这种事情的时候，如果有其他原因共同导致或者扩大损失，保险人也有保障可去拒赔。这可以节录1992年协会货物条文之4.1是规定：―In no case shall this insurance cover loss damage or expense attributable to wilful misconduct of the Assured.‖与1906年《英国海上保险法》之Section 55(1)(a)：―The insurer is not liable for any loss attributable to the wilful misconduct of the assured…‖对比之下，就看以看到两者都采用了相同的措辞―attributable to‖。
《Arnould‘s Law of Marine Insurance and Average》，第16版对―attributable‖一词的解释是如下：―It seems, however, to be clear in principle that wilful misconduct of the assured is a defence not only when it is the proximate cause of loss but also when it is only one of the effective causes of, or factors contributing to a loss. A similar rule appears also to obtain in cases, of the type provided for in section 39(5) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, where the ship is sent to sea in an unseaworthy state, with the privity of the assured.‖
从这个意义上说，―attributable to‖的意思不必局限在近因，而只要是受保人的恶意行为是导致损失的其中一个有效原因就已经是足够。
另是在这一个用词，不论有没有在前面加上―reasonably‖应该都是同一个意思。《Arnould‘s Law of Marine Insurance and Average》关于该词的到底有怎样的作用论述如下：―The test for causation under the words ?reasonably attributable to‘ may be less stringent than the proximate cause test. In principle, it appears that reasonable evidence of a causal link between the specified peril and the loss claimed is sufficient under this part of the clause.`‖
但在The ―Salem‖ (1982) 1 Lloyd‘s Rep. 369(CA)，上诉庭Kerr大法官有不同的看法，认为―attributable to‖是不能去改变近因原则。他是这样说：―But I think that these words ?may have been attributable to‘ are neutral words which cannot be read as intended to alter the well-established principles of causation in this field.‖这在John Dunt 2009年所著的《Marine Cargo Insurance》130页分析该案例，认为是该案件的情况特殊，并且Kerr大法官只是随口讲讲（obiter）。John Dunt的结论还是：―‘Attributable to‘ is wider than proximately caused by and covers the case where the risk is ?a‘ cause of the loss even where it is only one of the effective causes or factors contributing to the loss. ‖
毕竟在合约的解释是用明示的合约条文改变默示的法律地位，就必须说的十分清楚。其实现在什么样的用词可以将近因原则有效的排除还不是很明朗，像
―caused by‖、―resulting from‖、―due to‖、―arising from‖、―consequences of‖这些用词都不足够改变近因的原则。
首先介绍―caused by‖，Scrutton大法官在先例Coxe v. Employers Liability Assurance (1916.) 2 KB 629中是说：―They are words which always have been construed as relating to the proximate cause.‖
接下去介绍―resulting from‖，上诉庭的Potter大法官在先例Lloyds TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v. Lloyds Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (2002) Lloyd‘s Rep IR 113中是说：―In my view the expression ?result from‘ undoubtedly imparts the notion of causation which, in turn, in all branches of insurance law, involves application of the notion of proximate cause, applied with good sense, so as to give effect to and not to defeat the intention of the parties.‖
关于―due to‖与―arising from‖，《Arnould‘s Law of Marine Insurance and Average》，第16版在第938页是这样说：―Words such as ?due to‘ ?resulting from‘ ?arising from‘ in an exceptions clause in a policy have been construed as excluding only those losses proximately caused by the events mentioned.‖
4.5 同时有多个近因（concurrent causes）
根据严格的近因说法或理论，是必须要去找出一个造成损失的原因作为有效的近因，而不能有多过一个的原因去作为近因。这在一些案件中会带来困难，因为有多过一个原因造成而且很难分的出什么是最重要与最有效的原因。这在P. Samuel &Co. v. Dumas （1924）A.C. 431; 18 Ll.L. Rep 200，在贵族院持不同意见的Sumner大法官也有涉及这一个问题说：―Where a loss is caused by two perils operating simultaneously at the time of loss and one is wholly excluded because the policy is warranted free of it, the question is whether it can be denied that the loss was so caused, for if not the warranty operates. ‖
另在Leyland Shipping v. Norwich Union (1918) AC 350 (HL)，Wright勋爵是这样说：―…where there are two perils both of which are proximate causes of the loss and in an open policy the shipowner could have recovered on either, then, if one of those perils is excepted by the warranty the underwriters are not liable.‖
但可以说是权威性的先例针对两个或以上的近因还是欠缺，直到Wayne Tank & Pump v. Employers‘ Liability (1973) 2 Lloyd‘s Rep. 237，在这个有关火灾的先例是工厂里面安置了一个有缺陷与危险的设备，起火是因为在没有人监管的情况
下将该设备开动，这涉及了员工的疏忽。这就带来到底是危险设备还是员工疏忽才是近因，前者是保险合约的除外风险，后者是在保险合约承保的范围内。Denning勋爵在上诉庭认为根据正常思维或是常识（common sense）应该是危险设备，说：
―So I would approach this case by asking which of the two causes was the effective or dominant cause? I should have thought that it was the first cause, the dangerous nature of the installation, and thus within the exception. So that the Employers‘ Liability were not liable under this policy.
The Judge was much inclined to hold that it was the dangerous installation which was the dominant cause. But he was dissuaded from that view by Mr. Le Quesne (原告代表大律师), who argued, with his usual persuasiveness, that the act of the man (in switching on the heating tape) was a movus actus intervenience which was predominant in effectiveness. It was the cause of the fire. It did not come within the exceptions. So the Employers‘ Liability were liable.
I must say that I do not care for this emphasis on novus actus interveniens. It seems to me to be going back to the old and forsaken test of the latest in time. I would reject novus actus. I would ask, as a matter of common sense, what was the effective or dominant cause of the fire? To that question I would answer that it was the dangerous installation of a pipe which was likely to melt under heat. It seems to me that the conduct of the man in switching on the heating tape was just the trigger—the precipitating event—which brought about the disaster. There would have been no trouble whatever if the system had been properly designed and installed.
Seeing that the dangerous installation was the dominant cause, it comes within the exceptions and the Employers‘ Liability company are not liable on this policy.
That is enough to decide the case. But I will assume, for the sake of argument, that I am wrong about this: and that there was not one dominant cause, but two causes which were equal or nearly equal in their efficiency in bringing about the damage. One of them is within the general words and would render the insurers liable. The other is within the exception and would exempt them from liability. In such a case it would seem that the insurers can rely on the exception clause. There is not much authority on it…‖
要强调的是去适用―同时有多个近因‖的说法，必须无法在合理找出一个近因的
情况下。Potter大法官在The ―Aliza Glacial‖ (2002) 2 Lloyd's Rep 421一案中说：―It is only when a court is driven to the conclusion of more than one proximate cause, that the concurrent cause rules apply.‖
在―同时有多个近因‖的说法下，可以粗略地去分为3种情况，（一）多个近因都属于承保的列名风险；（二）多个近因有一个是承保的列名风险，但其他的既没有说是承保也没有说是排除；（三）多个近因有一个是承保的列名风险，另有一个是被排除的列名风险。
4.5.1多个近因都属于承保的列名风险
在这种情况下，应该明确不过就是保险人要承担赔付的责任。比方说，船员疏忽造成海上灾难，而两个都是承保的列名风险，保险人显然是要负责。
4.5.2多个近因有一个是承保的列名风险，但其他的既没有说是承保也没有说是排除
在这种情况下，保险人也需要负责。这可去节录Bennett教授所著的《The Law of Marine Insurance》第二版之9.22段所说的话：―Provided the policy covers at least one of the perils qualifying as a proximate cause of the loss and none are expressly excluded, the assured is entitled to recover. The loss is caused by a covered peril and there is nothing in the policy to deny cover.‖这方面有关的先例是The ―Miss Jay Jay‖ (1987) 1 Lloyd‘s Rep 32, 案情是涉及一个设计有缺陷的游艇在航行中发生全损。这设计上的缺陷导致该游艇超过一定速度航行时会离开海平面，而设计上没有缺陷的游艇仍是会贴着海平面。全损是有它本身的设计缺陷导致的不适航以及坏的天气（虽然并非是不正常的坏天气）共同造成，两个都属于有效的近因，因为缺少任何其中的一个原因都不会造成游艇的全损。坏天气是在保险合约承保的范围内，而设计缺陷导致不适航就没有明确说明是承保，但也没有被列名在除外条款内。这是因为该船舶保险是定期保险合约(time policy)，1906年《英国海上保险法》之Section39(5)说明期限保险合约是没有对适航的保证，只是在船东私谋让不适航的船舶开航的情况下才对不适航导致的损坏不用赔付。显然设计有缺陷导致不适航不会是船东的私谋。上诉庭的Slade大法官说：
―However, since the instant policy contains no relevant exception relating to loss caused by unseaworthiness of the vessel, different principles apply. The legal position in such a case is stated thus in Halsbury‘s Laws of England (4th ed.) vol. 25 par. 181 which relates to marine insurance policies:
It seems that there may be more than one proximate (in the sense of effective or direct) cause of a loss. If one of these causes is insured against under the policy and none of the others is expressly excluded from the policy; the assured will be entitled to recover.
No authority has been cited to us which leads me to suppose that this passage incorrectly states the relevant law relating to marine insurance policies and, in my judgment, it incorporates the principle applicable to the present case. The crucial point is that in the contingencies envisaged in the passage, for the purpose of applying the provisions of the policy and s. 55 of the Act, the loss is treated as proximately caused by the cause insured against, notwithstanding the presence of a concurrent cause not covered by the policy. ‖
4.5.3多个近因有一个是承保的列名风险，另有一个是被排除的列名风险
在这种情况下，就更加复杂了，因为要涉及怎样全面解释有关的保险合约。这里涉及了承保的列名风险或一切险与排除的风险（明示或默示）之间的冲突，但又必须要去给它们都有一定的解释。作为起点，可以说是特别在一切险，如果有一条明示的条文针对一些排除的风险，就可以根据两个解释合约的规则去说明排除的风险应该超越一切险。第一个解释合约的规则是―假设双方不会约定多余的内容‖，因为如果除外风险条文的效力是高于一切险条文则就给了除外条文一定的效力，但如果相反认为除外风险条文的效力是低于一切险条文，那么除外风险条文的存在就显得多余。第二个解释合约的规则是―面窄与特别针对一件事的条文超越广泛与一般性的条文‖。这些合约解释的规则在笔者所著的《合约的解释》一书中有详细介绍，请参阅。
但由于有不同的保险合约与不同的措词/结构，所以会有情况是不允许排除的风险去完全否定承保的列名风险，也有情况是判特定排除的风险超越了承保的列名风险。
在前一种情况下，可举第一个先例是The ―Lydia Flag‖ (1998) 2 Lloyd‘s Rep 652。该船在航次中掉了船舵，估计是几个月前在干坞进行修理，工人拆除检查的时候疏忽导致。有关的保险合约格式是1983年条文协会船舶定期保险条文，其中第6.2.4条有修理人疏忽的列名风险。但该保险合约多加了一个附加保证，说明保险合约在开始生效的时候船舶必须适航，有关条款如下：
―11. Warranted that at the inception of this policy the vessel…shall be in a seaworthy condition and thereafter during the valid period of this policy the insured shall