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1、徐文星，刘晓琴：《21世纪行政法背景下的公众参与》，《法律科学》，第2007第1期。 2、孙笑侠：《程序的法理》，商务印书馆。
3、马怀德：《行政程序立法研究——行政程序法建议草案及说明书》，法律出版社2003年。 4、周佐勇：《行政法基本原则研究》，武汉大学出版社2005年版。 5、（日）原田尚彦：《行政法要论》，日本学阳书房1986年版。
6、王锡锌：《公众参与和行政过程——一个理念和制度分析的架构》，中国民主法制出版社2007年版。 7、刘超、胡伟:《政府社会管理中的公众参与：模式、经验与启示》，《吉首大学学报》2007年第1期。 8、应松年：《比较行政程序法》，中国法制出版社1999年版。
9、王巍：《公众回应性:服务行政的核心特征——服务型政府回应机制的流程与制度设计》，《行政论坛》2004年第05期。
10 、沈荣华，沈志荣：《服务型政府论要》，《行政法学研究》2008年第4期。 11、姜民安：《行政法与行政诉讼法》（第三版），北京大学出版社2007年版。 12、方世荣：《行政法与行政诉讼法》，中国政法大学出版社1999年版。 13、崔卓兰、于立深：《行政规章研究》，吉林人民出版社2002年版。
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致 谢
本次论文得到了XX老师认真负责的指导。从开始的选题，开题报告和任务书，大纲到论文正文修改和思路的引导，X老师都给予耐心细致的指导。秉承严谨的学术态度，通过老师的指点，使论文思路清晰，内容充实。在此衷心感谢XX老师！同时，感谢多年来在法学学习的道路上教授我知识的全体法学院的老师们，感谢你们对我的关心与培养。还有要感谢在完成论文的过程中给予我帮助的同学们！
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Study of the public participation system in Administrative plan
——Based on the Panyu Waste Incineration Incident Analysis
【Abstract】Administrative plan works as a Administrative Actions based on Authority,
which always relates to the public interests during the process. Therefore, with the time request of the function shifting of the government and the development of the administrative law concept, service-oriented government has become developing direction of our government and its core is public participation and the transformation of the functions. Therefore, the Administrative plan，a kind of administration actions affects the public interests profoundly, becomes the vital elements in the problem of whether the administrative plan could reflect the publics’ mind effectively, how deep the public can get involved and how to build up the public participation system. The article try to provide a legislation support and system construction for the public participation through analyzing the specific case..
【Key words】Administrative plan; Public participation system; Legislation support and
system construction Service-oriented government
文献翻译:
【CA】Frank Cunningham: Theories of Democracy
Chapter III：Liberal democracy
As part of his highly publicized, provocative thesis that after the fall of communism in Europe and with it the withering of grand ideological contests, history has ended, Francis Fukuyama maintains that Western liberal democracy has become ‘the final form of human government’ (1992: xi). Whatever the merits of Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ theory, his claim about liberal democracy has in its favour that nearly all democracies or aspiring democracies are typically described, both in theoretical circles and in popular discourse as liberal democratic. As will be seen, not all theorists believe liberal democracy to be either the best or the only feasible form of democracy, but such theorists are in a minority, and positions that even a decade ago were advanced in opposition to liberal democracy are now proposed as versions, deepenings, or realizations of it. For these reasons, this chapter and the next will begin the book’s survey of democratic theories with an extended discussion of liberal democracy. In so doing, I shall abstract from efforts to explain the pervasiveness of institutions and practices called liberal democratic to focus on core features of the theory.
J.S. Mill’s formulation
In his essays, On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government, John Stuart Mill set out what is often considered the first systematic explication and defence of liberal democracy. As a prodemocrat, Mill welcomed the progress in equality about which Tocqueville was anxious; yet in a review of Democracy in America he still enthusiastically recommended the work to his fellow Britons, among other reasons because he found Tocqueville’s warnings about the tyranny of the majority well taken (Mill 1976 [1835/40]: 213–19). In particular Mill agreed with Tocqueville’s claims that majority, mass culture stifles free and informed thought and that an omnipotent majority could oppress a minority. Taken together, Mill’s essays may in large part be read as a sustained effort to confront this problem by the straightforward method of combining democracy and liberalism.
In previous eras, Mill observed, tyranny was something experienced by the majority of a
nation’s people at the hands of a minority so there was no danger of the majority ‘tyrannizing over itself.’ But with the emergence of large democratic nations (he cites in particular the US) a need was created for the people ‘to limit their power over themselves’ (Mill 1991b [1859]: 7). The aim of On Liberty, then, was to identify the principles in accord with which the people should secure this limitation. Most of the essay is devoted to explication and defence of Mill’s claim that ‘the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good . . . is not a sufficient warrant.’ (14). In form, this injunction prescribes against government paternalism as well as against overt tyranny and in favour of what is often now called the ‘pluralist’ mandate that citizens ought as far as possible to be able to pursue what they see as their own goods and in their own ways (17).
In giving his principle content, Mill listed the most important liberties to protect, namely the freedoms of conscience, thought and feeling, holding and expressing opinions, pursuing one’s life plans, and combining with others for any (nonmalicious) purpose. Because these civil liberties typically and directly affect only those who enjoy them, people should be exempt from the interference, paternalistic or otherwise, by others and especially by the state, including the democratic state (16–17). Mill devoted little space to working out the details of how the liberties are to be safeguarded, but it is clear that in general he thought there should be areas of citizens’ lives free of state regulation and legal limits on what even a democratically mandated government can legislate. That is, he favoured preservation of a distinction between private and public realms and the rule of law. Regarding democracy, direct citizen participation in the affairs of government is, in Mill’s view, to be encouraged primarily for its functions of engendering confidence in people about their ability to govern themselves and of developing intellectual talents and communal, moral values. However, since direct participation is impossible in a large society, Mill thought that ‘the ideal type of a perfect government must be a representative democracy’ (Mill 1991a [1861]: 256).
Varieties of liberal-democratic theory
With the exception of one of these provisions, almost no theorist prepared to accept the liberal-democratic label would wish to make substantive changes in Mill’s characterization of democracy and liberalism, though there is obviously room for many differences over how best to preserve civil liberties or structure representative democracy. For instance, regarding representation some theorists favour parliamentary and others presidential systems of government, some (including Mill) proportional representation, others first past the post representation, some a free hand for elected officials, others provision for inter-election accountability such as recall. These and other such differences are clearly very important at the level of ongoing liberal democratic practice, but their connection to general theory is no more than indirect. Similarly, debates over how to interpret civil liberties – for instance, whether or not advertizing is a form of expression to be protected as freedom of speech or whether restrictions on campaign financing are a violation of civil rights——reflect differences over the application of liberal-democratic principles rather than differences over the principles themselves.
Participation
In most controversies of political theory the line between principled differences and
variations in application, interpretation, or emphasis is blurred. One exception is in Mill’s enthusiasm for participation. This is the element of his characterization of liberal democracy in the list above that is not shared by all liberal-democratic theorists (for instance Giovanni Sartori or William Riker). In fact, some critics of liberal democracy from the direction of participatory democracy see in Mill’s participationism a (for them welcomed) deviation from liberal-democratic theory (Pateman 1970: 28–34). If Mill held that democracy should only be by direct participation or that representative democracy is not only necessary, but a necessary evil, these critics would be right. However, Mill thought that representative democracy had some positive features of its own (such as making it easier to ensure that government decisions would be made by educated people) and that, when feasible, it should be combined with direct participation. Because a measure of participatory democracy, albeit limited, is allowed to be possible and desirable by theorists even more closely identified with liberal democracy than Schumpeter, such as Robert Dahl (1970a: 102–3, 1989: 338–9), a case can be made to consider this an area of disagreement within liberal-democratic theory, rather than as a dividing line between it and alternatives.
Equality
Other differences concern equality. Mill is often and in important respects ustly classified an egalitarian. He was among the few males of his time forcefully to advocate extension of the franchise to women (Mill 1971 [1869]), and his views on the distribution of wealth put him toward the socialistic end of a spectrum of stances on the question of how far liberal democrats should insist on politics favouring social and economic equality. Ronald Dworkin (1983) may also be located somewhere in the egalitarian ‘camp,’ as, according to most interpreters, may John Rawls, and Dahl has moved in this direction over the course of his career (contrast Dahl, 1956 and 1985). Robert Nozick (who does not classify himself a liberal democrat) insists that liberal principles dictate anti-egalitarianism (1974). The late Isaiah Berlin, while not explicitly anti-egalitarian, was sceptical about sanctioning more than formal, political equality in the name of liberal democracy (1969 [1958]).
For Mill ‘the pure idea of democracy’ is ‘government of the whole people by the whole people, equally represented,’ which requires proportional representation so a minority is not denied government representatives (1991a [1861]: 302–3). However, this egalitarianism does not carry over to the vote, where Mill’s view differs with most other liberal-democratic theorists. On the mainstream view, political equality is a central value and is interpreted as equality in the polling booth. Mill did not agree: ‘I do not look upon equal voting as among the things that are good in themselves,’ he announced, and he went on to explain that by granting the educated and the uneducated equal votes, a democracy harmfully declared ‘ignorance to be entitled to as much political power as knowledge’ (ibid.: 340)
翻译：
第3章 自由民主