管理决策期末作业
中心和在MTI ，固体火箭的私人供应商管理的最高级别 增压发动机。
简要地说明情况， MTI工程师建议不要启动，如果气温在火箭的O型圈密封件均低于53华氏度，这是以往任何飞行的最低温度。劳伦斯B.马洛伊，固体火箭助推器项目于马歇尔太空飞行中心的经理，说：
。 。 ，那底线，虽然，最初是聚硫橡胶工程，鲍勃·隆德，谁是副总裁兼工程总监，今天谁在这里，建议51 -L [挑战者]无法启动，如果O型圈温度在启动时预测会比以往任何发射低，那是53度。 。 。
launch, and that was 53 degrees . . . (Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle
Accident, 1986, p. 91-92).
This recommendation was made at
8:45 pm,.January 27, 1986 (Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Accident, 1986). Through the ensuing discussions the decision to launch was made. Antecedent Conditions
The three primary antecedent conditions for the development of groupthink are: a highly cohesive group, leader preference for a certain decision, and insulation of the group from qualified outside opinions. These conditions existed in this situation.
Cohesive Group. The people who made the decision to launch had worked together for many years. They were familiar with each other and had grown through the ranks of the space program. A high degree of esprit de corps existed between the members.
Leader Preference. Two top level managers actively promoted their pro-launch opinions in the face of opposition. The commission report states that several managers at space centers and MTI pushed for launch, regardless of the low temperatures. Insulation from Experts. MTI engineers made their recommendations relatively early in the evening. The top level decision-making group knew of their objections but did not meet with them directly to review their data and concerns. As Roger Boisjoly, a Thiokol engineer, states in his remarks to the Presidential Commission:
I was not even asked to participate in gi'ving
any input to the frnal decision charts(Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Accident, 1986, p. 91-92).
This testimonial indicates that the top decision-making team was insulated from the engineers who possessed the expertise regarding the functioning of the equipment. Groupthink Symptoms
(总统委员会对航天飞机事故， 1986
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年，第91-92报告） 。
这个建议是20时45分。 1986年1月27日（总统委员会对航天飞机事故，1986报告） 。通过随后的讨论中，推出决定做出。 先行条件
这三个主要的前提条件，群体思维的发展是：一个高度凝聚力的群体，领导者偏好某种决定，本集团向合格的外部意见的绝缘。这些条件存在这种情况。
凝聚力的群体。谁做的决定，推出的人已经工作多年在一起。他们熟悉彼此，并通过太空计划的行列中长大。的袍泽高度存在的成员之间。
领导者优先。两个顶级经理积极推动他们的亲发射意见反对面前。该
委员会报告指出，不同的基金经理在空间中心和MTI被推为发射，不管低温。
绝缘从专家。 MTI公司的工程师在晚上比较早的提出自己的建议。顶层决策组知道他们的反对意见，但他们并没有直接见面，检讨自己的数据和关注。正如罗杰Boisjoly ，一个聚硫橡胶工程师，在他的言论指出，以总统委员会：
我什至没有要求参加gi'ving任何输入到frnal决定图表（总统委员会对航天飞机事故， 1986年，第91-92报告） 。
这证明表明最高决策层团队从谁拥有有关设备的运作的专业知识的工程师绝缘。
群体思维症状
Janis identified eight symptoms of
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管理决策期末作业
groupthink. They are presented here along with evidence from the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Accident (1986).
Invulnerability. When groupthink occurs, most or all of the members of the decision-making group have an illusion of invulnerability that reassures them in the face of obvious dangers. This illusion leads the group to become over optimistic and willing to take extraordinary risks. It may also cause them to ignore clear warnings of danger.
The sojid rocket joint problem that destroyed Challenger was discussed often at flight readiness review meetings prior to flight. However,Commission member Richard Feynman concjuded from the testimony that a mentality of overconfidence existed due to the extraordinary record of success of space flights. Every time we send one up it is successful. Involved members may seem to think that on the next one we can lower our standards or take more risks because it always works (Time, 1986).
The invulnerability illusion may have built up over time as a result of NASA's own spectacular history. NASA had not lost an astronaut since 1967 when a flash fire in the capsule of Apoll0 1 killed three. Since that time NASA had a string of 55 successful missions. They had put a man on the moon, built and launched Skylab and the shuttle, and retrieved defective satellites from orbit. In the minds of most Americans and apparently their own, they could do no wrong.
Rationalization. Victims of groupthink collectively construct rationalizations that discount warnings and other forms of negative feedback. If these signals were taken seriously when presented, the group members would be forced to reconsider their assumptions each time they re-commit themselves to their past decisions.
他们在这里提出一起从总统委员会对航天飞机事故（ 1986）报告的证据。
无懈可击的错觉。当发生群体思维，大多数或所有决策小组的成员有刀枪不入的一个错觉，以为可令他们在明显的危险面前。这种错觉导致本集团成为乐观，并愿意承担非常大的风险。它可能也会使他们忽视的危险明显的警告。
该sojid火箭关节的问题，摧毁挑战者往往在讨论之前，飞行飞行准备检讨会议。然而，委员会成员理查德·费曼从过度自信的心态存在由于太空飞行成功的非凡记录的证词concjuded 。我们送一上来它的每一次成功。参与成员似乎认为就下单，我们可以降低我们的标准或冒更大的风险，因为它总是工作（时间， 1986） 。
詹尼斯确定了八个症状的群体思维。
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无懈可击的错觉可能已经建立了随着时间的推移，作为美国航空航天局自己的历史壮观的结果。美国航空航天局自1967年以来，当在Apoll0 1的胶囊火光一闪杀害了三名没有失去一名宇航员。自那时以来，美国航空航天局有55成功使命的字符串。他们把一个人送上月球，建造和发射太空实验室和航天飞机，并回收有缺陷的卫星从轨道上。在大多数美国人显然对自己的头脑，他们可以做的没有错。
合理化。群体思维的受害者共同构造打折警告和其他形式的负反馈合理化。如果这些信号被认真对待的时候提出，小组成员将被迫每次他们重新致力于其过去的决定重新考虑他们的假设。
In the Level I flight readiness meeting when the Challenger was given final launch approval, MTI engineers presented evidence that the joint would fail. Their argument was based on the fact that in the coldest previous launch (air temperature 30 degrees) the joint in question experienced serious erosion and that no data existed as to how the joint would perform at colder temperatures. FJight center officiajs put forth numerous technical rationalizations faulting MTI's analysis. One of these rationalizations was that the engineer's data were inconclusive. As Mr. Boisjoly emphasized to the Commission:Discussions became twisted (compared to previous meetings) and no one detected it. Under normal conditions, MTI would have to prove the shuttle boosters readiness for launch, instead they found themselves being forced to prove that the boosters were unsafe. Boisjoly's testimony supports this description of the discussion: . . . This was a meeting where the determination
was to launch, and it was up to us to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that it was not safe to do so. This is in total reverse to what the position usually is in a preflight conversation or a flight readiness review. It is usually exactly opposite of thai . . . (Repori of the Presidential
Commission on the Space Shuttle Accident, 1986, p. 93).
Moraliry. Group members often believe, without question, in the inherent morality of their position. They tend to ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their decision.
In the Challenger case, this point was raised by a very high level MTI manager, Allan J. McDonald, who tried to stop the launch and said that he would not want to have to defend the decision to launch. He stated to the Commission:
. . . I made the statement that if we're wrong
and something goes wrong on this flight, I wouldn't
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在一级飞行准备会议时，挑战者给予最终批准上市， MTI公司的工程师提出的证据表明，联合将会失败。他们的论据是基于，在最寒冷的先前推出的（空气温度30度）有问题的联合经历了严重的侵蚀和没有数据存在，如何联合将在较低温度下进行的事实。 FJight中心officiajs提出了许多合理化的技术断层MTI的分析。其中一个合理化的是，工程师的数据是不确定的。由于Boisjoly先生强调委员会：讨论成为扭曲的（相比于以往的会议） ，没有人发现它。在正常情况下， MTI必须证明航天飞机的助推器准备发射，相反，他们发现自己被强迫证明助推器不安全。 Boisjoly的证词支持的讨论这样的描述：
。 。 。这是一个会议的地方是决心发动，这是由我们来证明超出了怀疑，这是不是安全的这样做了一层阴影。这是总的反向到什么位置通常是在预检谈话或飞行准备检讨。它通常是完全相反的泰国。 （总统的Repori委员会在航天飞机事故， 1986年，页。 93 ） 。
道德。集团成员往往认为，毫无疑问，其立场的内在道德。他们往往忽略了他们的决定的伦理和道德后果。
在挑战者的情况下，这点是提出了很高的水平MTI经理，艾伦J.麦当劳，谁试图阻止发射，并表示他不希望要捍卫发射的决定。他说委员会：
我认为，如果我们错了，不顺心的事，这个航班，我不希望必须要站
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