国有控股上市公司管理者特征对企业投资效率的影
响研究
摘要
近年来,诸多研究发现世界范围内多数公司股权结构较为集中,大小股东间的代理冲突逐步取代股东-经理人间的代理冲突,成为公司治理研究的焦点问题。控制权与所有权的分离,使控股股东有动机和能力利用其对公司的控制权攫取控制权私有收益,受该动机驱使,控股股东基于自身利益最大化而非企业价值最大化做出决策。因此,控股股东对控制权私有收益的追求以及控制权私有收益对公司财务政策尤其是非效率投资行为的影响,越来越受到国内外学者的关注。研究控股股东对中小股东的利益侵占及其对非效率投资行为的影响,对于现阶段我国公司治理制度的完善、公司治理结构的优化配置和中小股东权益的保护,都具有重要的理论和实践意义。本文通过对当前我国的国有控股上市公司的管理者特征的应用，逐步发展在呈现出来的建设性的影响，这样的影响能够客观上影响企业的投资效率，在整个研究的过程中，按照“提出假设→建立模型→实证研究→分析结果→得出结论”顺序来构建，完全呈现出整个当前的发展的模式性和呈现方式。
在研究上，本文的主要有两个创新点：
第一，在研究管理者特征对企业投资的影响时，以往的研究都局限与研究企业现金流量表总的长期投资，而本文将企业资产负债表中的投资分为长期投资和短期投资两类，分别研究管理者特征对这两类投资的影响，结果作对比。
第二，在测量投资是否有效时，本文不仅运用Richardson模型将长期投资效率量化，对短期投资效率的量化同样采取这个模型，对于这方面课题的研究是很少的。
关键词：国有控股；上市公司；管理者；投资效率；分析
Abstract
In recent years, many studies have found that most companies worldwide in the shareholding structure is relatively concentrated, the size of the agency conflict between shareholders gradually replace shareholder, the agency conflict between the manager and become the focus of corporate governance research problems. Control and the separation of the ownership of a controlling shareholder have motivation and ability to use its grab control private benefits of control of the company, driven by the motivation, the controlling shareholders make decisions based on self-interest maximization not business value maximization. Therefore, the pursuit of a controlling shareholder's private benefits of control and control private benefits for the company's financial policy, in particular, is the influence of the efficiency of investment behavior, more and more get the attention of scholars both at home and abroad. The controlling shareholders encroach on the interests of small and medium shareholders and its influence on the efficiency of investment behavior, for the improvement of the system of corporate governance at present stage, the optimal allocation of corporate governance structure and the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders, has important theoretical and practical significance. This article through to the current our country state-owned holding company, the managers of listed companies the characteristics of the application of the constructive, gradually developed in the present such effects can objectively affect the investment efficiency of the enterprise, in the course of the study, according to the hypothesis \\\a model to empirical research, analysis, concluded that\\\in order to build, fully presents the current development pattern and presentation.
In the research, there are two main innovations of this article:
First, in the management characteristics of enterprise investment, the influence of the previous studies are limited and research enterprise overall long-term investment of the cash flow statement, and this article will enterprise the investment in the balance sheet is divided into two categories, long-term investment and short-term
investments, respectively study the effects of manager characteristics of these two types of investment, the results are compared.
Second, investment in measuring whether or not effective, this article not only quantification, long-term investment efficiency by Richardson model for short-term investment efficiency of quantitative also adopt this model, for this topic research is few.
Keywords： The state-owned holding company; The listed company; Managers; Investment efficiency; Analysis
目录
第1章 绪 论 ............................................................................................................... 6
1.1选题背景与研究意义 ..................................................................................... 6
1.1.1选题背景 .............................................................................................. 6 1.1.2研究意义 .............................................................................................. 6 1.2国内外研究现状 ............................................................................................. 7
1.2.1国外研究现状 ...................................................................................... 7 1.2.2国内研究现状 ...................................................................................... 9 1.2.3国内外研究评述 ................................................................................ 11 1.3研究内容与方法 ........................................................................................... 11
1.3.1研究内容 ............................................................................................ 11 1.3.2研究方法 ............................................................................................ 12
第2章 相关理论基础与概念界定 ........................................................................... 12
2.1相关概念界定 ............................................................................................... 12
2.1.1国有控股上市公司 ............................................................................ 12 2.1.2管理者特征 ........................................................................................ 13 2.1.3 企业投资 ........................................................................................... 13 2.2高阶梯队理论 ............................................................................................... 14 2.3委托代理理论 ............................................................................................... 14 2.4 本章小结 ...................................................................................................... 15 第3章 国有控股上市公司管理者特征与企业投资现状分析 ............................... 16
3.1国有控股上市公司发展现状 ....................................................................... 16
3.1.1上市公司的股权结构非流通性比例过大 ........................................ 16 3.1.2 国有企业的最大股份为公司非个人 ............................................. 16 3.1.3存在内部人控制现状 ........................................................................ 17 3.2 国有控股上市公司管理者特征分析 .......................................................... 17
3.2.1管理者的基本自然属性特征 ............................................................ 17 3.2.2管理者的社会背景特征 .................................................................... 18 3.3 国有控股上市公司的长期投资现状 .......................................................... 19
3.3.1地方政府干预国有上市公司长期投资 ............................................ 19 3.3.2 管理者与过度投资 ........................................................................... 19 3.3.3 投资效益率不确定性因素多 ........................................................... 20 3.4 国有控股上市公司的短期投资现状 .......................................................... 21 3.5 本章小结 ...................................................................................................... 21
第4章 管理者特征对企业投资效率影响的回归模型的建立与分析 ................... 22
4.1研究假设 ....................................................................................................... 22 4.2变量定义与数据来源 ................................................................................... 22
4.2.1管理者特征变量定义和选取 ............................................................ 22 4.2.2 企业投资效率的量化 ....................................................................... 23 4.2.3数据来源 ............................................................................................ 24 4.3 管理者特征对企业长期投资效率影响的回归模型的建立与分析 .......... 24
4.3.1描述性统计 ........................................................................................ 24 4.3.2相关性分析 ........................................................................................ 25 4.3.3回归结果分析 .................................................................................... 26 4.4 管理者特征对企业短期投资效率影响的回归模型的建立与分析 .......... 27
4.4.1描述性统计 ........................................................................................ 27 4.4.2相关性分析 ........................................................................................ 28 4.4.3回归结果分析 .................................................................................... 28 4.5本章小结 ....................................................................................................... 29 第5章 优化管理层结构以提高企业投资效率的对策建议 ................................... 31
5.1对上市公司在选任管理者时的建议 ........................................................... 31
5.1.1 管理经验型取舍谨慎 ....................................................................... 31 5.1.2 激励制度体现出股抽分配的有效性 ............................................... 31 5.2完善现有管理层的对策建议 ....................................................................... 32
5.2.1 阶梯式管理决策的实施 ................................................................... 32 5.2.2 民主评议制度的构建 ....................................................................... 32 5.3 制度层面构建的建议 .................................................................................. 33
5.3.1减少直接行政干预 ............................................................................ 33 5.3.2完善公司治理制度、改变国有股一股独大的局面 ........................ 33 5.3.3健全国有上市公司监管机制，推行高管薪酬制度改革 ................ 34 5.3本章小结 ....................................................................................................... 34 结论.............................................................................................................................. 35 参考文献...................................................................................................................... 36 致谢.............................................................................................................................. 40