nal and international constrains, the one thing that ministers usually can do--with the appearance of dynamism but at little immediate
直接的 cost--is to announce changes in their own machinery of governance. 公共管理改革通常被认为是一个结束的方式，并不是它本身要结束。更准确地说，也许我们应该说潜在地它是多样化结束的一个方式。这些包括节省公众支出、提高公共服务质量、使政府运作更加高效、增加被选择和被执行的政策会有效的机遇。在实现这些重要目标的征途上，公共管理改革也许会帮助实现许多中间的结果，包括那些增强政治家对于官僚机构的控制管理、从官僚制度的抑制中解除公共官员，由于政策和纲要这种约束抑制了他们管理和增强政府对于立法机关和市民的责任的机会。最后，应该提一下管理改革的象征性的和合法的利益。对于政治家来说，这些利益部分地由好象做点什么事情组成。宣布改革、责备官僚作风、赞扬新的管理方式、允诺为将来的改良的服务、调整部门和机构。对于支持这些的政治家来说，所有这些活动都有益于吸引赞扬的目光。一个愤世嫉俗的人也许会注意到在那些当个人独裁政府的权力显示出独立姿态的日子里，问题总是被一个由当地的、国家的和国际的约束组成的并且相互影响的复杂体不断持续地创造出来。大臣们通常能做的一件事情是用他们自己的国家管辖机器，以物力论的姿态但极少的直接成本来宣布变革。
There are also legitimacy benefits for those senior officials who, almost invariably不变地, shaping and implementing such initiatives革新. They may gain in reputation by association with \nd \使简化\对于那些几乎总是在对于主动的整修和执行中起着重要作用的高级官员来说也有其合法的利益。通过和“现代化的”和“流线型的”活动相结合，他们可能得到名望。
If management reform really does produce 约型、高效的 government, with higher-quality services and more effective programs, and if it will simultaneously同时地 enhance political control, free丰富的 managers to manage, make government more transparent and boost推进 the images of those ministers and mandarins普通话 most involved, then it is little wonder that it has been widely trumpeted庆祝，祝贺. Unfortunately, however, matters are not so simple. There is a good deal of evidence to how that management reforms can go wrong. They may produce the claimed需要的 benefits. They may even generate perverse不正当的 effects that render表现出 the relevant administrative progresses worse (in some important senses) than they were previously. When a local authority \ed people is reshaped改造，再形成 along 准市场机制, with a split口子 between the authority purchasing the service and the providing it, we may consider this a typical \t the contract合同 for the service is 700 pages long and that the actual service provided seems to have changed very little in either quality or quantity, then doubt sets in. we wonder if more trust between the parties concerned might not be a more efficient option选择. enabling a much shorter contract (or no contract at all) and radically根本上 reduced monitoring costs. 如果公共管理改革真的能产生一个更低价的、更高效的政府，拥有高质量的服务和更加有效的计划，并且如果它同时地能增强政治控制力、让自由的管理者来管理，使政府更加透明并且提高那些有关乎大臣们和官吏们的形象，这样的话大肆吹捧还没有什么疑问。但是，不幸地是，事情没有那么简单。 有大量的证据可以说明管理改革是怎么样变质的。也许他
们没有得到所要求的利益。他们甚至可能有不正当的努力来给予相关的管理进步补偿（更重要的），比他们以前更加可恶。当一位当地的权威人士为老人和残疾人顺着类似的市场条文，采用新方针照顾本地而服务时，该权威在购买服务和提供服务之间出现了裂痕。我们可以认为这是一种典型的“改革”。但是，当我们发现为该服务开出的契约有700页之长然而实际提供的服务看起来在质量上和数量上改变微乎其微时，我们的疑虑会越来越多。我们会想知
道是否有关的在党派之间的更多的信任是一个更加有效的选择。采用一个简短很多的契约（或者根本不用什么契约）和根本上来说减轻的控制才会物有所值。
Furthermore, even if a particular reform clearly \spect of one or two of the objectives mentioned above (savings, say, and improvement in quality) it is unlikely that it will succeed in all. Indeed, we shall argue later that certain trade-offs换位 and dilemmas进退两难的局面 are exceedingly非常地 common in administrative change, so that the achievement of one or two particular ends might well be \r specialized decision makers in a bureaucracy对于决策者的官僚作风的有关规定 is maintained by selective crackdowns打击 衡--without ever acknowledging that tightening up on one criterion implies slackening off放慢、减缓 on another\ to more effective political supervision and control, can we simultaneously gift them greater freedom and flexibility to manage? The optimists will say yes, by laying down a clearer, simpler framework of rules within which managers can \ pointing to survey evidence that the managers themselves think that
political \ as social security, health care, education or the prison service. 此外，即使一项很特殊的关于一个或两个上面提到过的目标的（储蓄、发言权和质量的提高）改革很明显地“成功了”，它也未必会全部成功。确实，稍后我们会争论在管理上的变化上某些交易和困难抉择是非常普遍的，所以从其他方面而言，一个或者两个特别结果的取得对于一个较低的成绩来说是很值得的。“在官僚机构中统治特殊决定制订者的规则是靠有选择地打击镇压某段时间的某个目标来维持的，操纵平衡而不必承认在某标准上很紧绷但在另外一个很松弛”。例如，如果我们在更加有效的政治监督和控制上受公仆的影响，我们能同时给予他们管理上更大的自由和弹性吗？乐天派会点头称是，他们会放弃一个更加清晰和简单的规则框架，尽管在该框架内管理者能更加有创造力。怀疑论持有者会大摇其头，指出这样的调查证据，管理者他们自己会认为在政治上的敏感操作诸如社会安全、健康保健、教育和监狱服务可以撒手不管。 In any case, public management reform is only one way to achieve most of the desirable ends identified in the first paragraph. To be adequate, any description of its nature will need to take into account that governmental performance can be improved by a variety of routes and that management reform is frequently undertaken in conjunction with other types of policy initiative. Comparing administrative developments in a number of countries one academic observed recently: \subject of all policy performance, not a separable set of technical efforts\无论如何，公共管理改革是能取得大多数那些在第一段提到的令人满意的结果的唯一途径。恰当地说，任何理由都应该考虑在内，通过一系列线路，政府的表现能够提高，管理改革频繁地承诺和其他种类的主动政策结合在一起。对
于在许多国家中比较的行政管理的发展，目前某一理论这样评论道“管理改革，是所有政策执行的主题，而不是一套可分的技术成就”。
Other routes to improved government performance include political reforms (such as changes in electoral systems or legislative procedures) and substantive changes in key policies (such as new macroeconomics management policies, labor market reforms or fundamental changes in social policy). The example of New Zealand--which combined management reforms with fundamental changes in both macroeconomic policies and, later, the electoral system--was alluded to in our introduction. 其他的可提高政府表现的线路包括政治改革（例如选举体系或立法程序中的变化）和关键政策上的实质性变革（例如宏观经济学管理政策、劳动市场改革或社会政策上的基本变革）。正如在我们的介绍中间接提到的新西兰的例子一样，管理改革
和两方面的基本变化结合在了一起：整体经济政策和其后的选举制度。 To make matters more complicated still, there is, as commentators have noticed, a delay which affects a good deal of public management reform. The full benefits of major changes in the processes and structures of public agencies normally cannot be harvested until three, four, five or even more years after a reform programs has been launched. To begin with, new legislation might formulate and refine new operating procedures, train staff how to work with them, define new roles and the appropriate , set new measurement systems in place, inform service users and other stakeholders赌金保管者, and work hard to redu