incentive effect and sort effect to improve the output level. However, empirical analyses suggest that the relations between CEO compensation and corporation performance is weak. The factors that reduce the pay-performance sensitivity include the increase of corporation scale, the variability of firm’s assets and constraints imposed by public and private political forces
(3) Wage and monitoring：Both efficiency wage theory and principal-agent theory indicate that the accuracy of monitoring and the level of wage are negatively related. But in efficiency wage theory, the assumptions are that workers only have a choice between two effort levels (working and shirking) and the level of effort provided by workers is exogenous variable. In principal-agent theory, they assume that it is static state. If we loosen these restrictions of the assumption, the accuracy of monitoring and the level of wage are positively related.
(4) Performance Measurement：Non-financial measurement and subjective measurement are paid much attention, and the importance of these measurements is testified by theoretical analysis. We should select informative and controllable performance measurements and adjust them with the changes in environment.
(5)Environment Risk：If the environment risk is high, imposing incentive plan on workers who are risk aversion will increase wage cost, therefore, the incentive plan should be reduced in this situation. But contrary view is that high environment risk makes it impossible to monitor input by workers directly, so more incentive plans should be used.
(6) organization structure：In hierarchical organization, the level of wage in beginning level is high, but the real wage of workers who cannot be promoted and are still at the beginning level will decline. When we determine the wage gap between two levels, we should consider some factors about ability and incentive.
On the basis of the literature review about firm-level wage decision, this article forecasts the possible tendencies of this field in future , such as empirical analysis will be used in researches of this field widely; empirical analysis will use more panel data; the studies will assume that workers are heterogeneous; in China, the researches on firm-level wage decisions will attract much more attention in economics field,
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especially in labor economics field.
In addition, the literatures of this article come from only five economic journals, so maybe some valuable literatures are missed. And because we do not review the articles about firm-level wage decision in management journals, we cannot compare the researches in economics and management. These limits need to be improved by further researches in future.
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目 录
第一章 导论 ........................................... 1
1.1 研究背景 .................................................... 1 1.2 研究目的与意义 .............................................. 2 1.2.1 研究目的 ............................................... 2 1.2.2 研究意义 ............................................... 3 1.3 研究方法 .................................................... 3 1.3.1 文献收集 ............................................... 4 1.3.2 文献整理 ............................................... 6
第二章 微观工资决策研究的回顾 ......................... 9
2.1 工资概念与研究方法 .......................................... 9 2.1.1 工资概念 ............................................... 9 2.1.2 研究方法 .............................................. 11 2.2 工资与努力、产出、监督是工资决策研究的关键变量 ............. 13 2.2.1 工资与努力的关系 ...................................... 13 2.2.2 工资与产出的关系 ...................................... 15 2.2.3 工资与监督的关系 ...................................... 17 2.3 绩效衡量、环境风险、企业组织结构是微观工资决策研究考虑的主要影响因素 ......................................................... 20 2.3.1 绩效衡量指标的选择 .................................... 20 2.3.2 环境的风险 ............................................ 23 2.3.3 企业的组织结构 ........................................ 25
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第三章 微观工资决策研究基本结论和趋势展望 ............. 28
3.1 微观工资决策研究基本结论 ................................... 28 3.2 微观工资决策研究趋势展望 ................................... 29 3.3 本文的研究局限 ............................................. 30
参考文献 .............................................. 32 附录：所选文献基本情况一览表 .......................... 39 致 谢 .................................. 错误！未定义书签。
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20世纪80年代以来微观工资决策研究的回顾——基于五种经济学顶尖期刊的分析结论
第一章 导论
1.1 研究背景
在经济学研究中，关于工资问题的研究具有悠久的历史，并且成为经济学研究的重要组成部分。在《国富论》中，亚当·斯密在分析国民财富增长的原因时，即对工资的质与量的规定性，进行了较为系统的分析。经济学家对工资问题的高度重视则正式开始于19世纪上半叶。在当时的历史条件下，经济学家日益强调市场交换的重要性，因此对分配领域的关注超过了对生产领域的关注。同时，由于社会结构的变化，劳动阶级的壮大，对有关国民收入中劳动所占份额之诸因素的解释尤为重要。以上两方面因素共同决定了工资问题在经济学领域受到高度关注，由此构成了经济学对工资问题进行专门研究的正式起源。工资问题成为政治经济学所有分支中最困难和最重要的问题（麦克纳尔蒂，1980）。
经济学所关注的工资问题的主题经历了一个发展变化的过程。在20世纪80年代之前，经济学对工资问题的研究主要涉及工资理论、工资水平与变动、工资差别等方面。而在80年代之后，经济学对工资问题的研究逐步拓展到企业内部，研究企业的工资决策问题。
20世纪80年代之前，经济学对工资问题的研究侧重于将工资作为劳动力的价格，在劳动力市场层面进行研究。以20世纪70年代C· A·摩尔根所著的《劳动经济学》第三版为例，全书对工资问题的论述包括三章内容，分别介绍了工资的性质与理论、短期工资的决定以及重要的工资趋向。其中，工资理论侧重于解释劳动力市场上影响工资决定的因素；“短期工资的决定”主要考察劳动力市场上，各种力量（雇主、工会、政府）对确定或影响工资率所起的作用；“重要的工资趋向”则介绍了货币工资水平和实际工资水平及其变动；职业间、产业间、地区间、种族间的工资差别状况以及工资构成的变动（摩尔根，1984）。
总之，在80年代之前，经济学关于工资问题的研究侧重于探讨以下三个方面的内容：考察宏观薪酬水平及其变动；为宏观层面上公平问题的解决提供分析框架；考察劳动力市场上各方力量对工资的影响作用。经济学对工资问题的
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